At China Mall, a vast supermarket in Kampala, Uganda’s capital, Rose Ahurra picks up a small turquoise squirrel. The toy flashes as she puts it in a trolley laden with towels, clothes, containers and an air fryer. The purchases indicate her place in the Ugandan middle class, which has flocked to China Mall since it opened earlier this year. “The prices are fair and I no longer have to go to lots of individual shops,” she explains.

But the floors of mostly Chinese goods also hint at an imbalance that worries African policymakers. Total trade between China and Africa was worth $296bn in 2024. Yet the value of what China exported west ($179bn) was much higher than what Africa sent east ($117bn). This year, partly as a result of the state support China is giving to its factories to boost the domestic economy, Chinese exports to the continent are on track to be 12% higher. African countries have long asked Beijing to make it easier to trade the other way, too. Many will have welcomed China’s announcement on June 12th that it will grant duty-free access to products from every African country except Eswatini, a tiny kingdom that recognises Taiwan.

The immediate impact may be minimal. But the policy could integrate African economies more deeply into Chinese-centred supply chains as the global economy is fragmenting. Geopolitically, China’s move is as subtle as a flashing turquoise squirrel. After 25 years America is set to end its own duty-free deal with Africa when the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) expires on September 30th. It is imposing tariffs willy-nilly, slashing aid and banning African migrants. For its biggest competitor, that is an opportunity.

China has become more important in African trade in the 21st century (see chart). In 2003 just 18 of Africa’s then 53 countries traded more with China than they did with America. Two decades later that is the case for 52 of Africa’s 54 states. The vast majority of this trade is in raw materials, which were duty-free even before June 12th. Most African exports to China come from three countries: oil-rich Angola, mineral-rich Congo, and South Africa, which is a hub for minerals exports. Though China said in 2021 that it would do more to help African exporters of manufactured and agricultural goods, these make up a tiny share of its imports.

In the short term, ending tariffs will help to make these African industries a bit more competitive internationally. Hasit Shah, who exports avocados from Kenya to China (and currently faces a tariff of 7%), says the move “will really help us against Peruvian fruit”, which already benefits from 0% duties. Maryna Calow of Wines of South Africa, a trade group, hopes that it will make local plonk competitive with Australian and Chilean varieties that already enjoy zero duties when entering China.

Yet duties are rarely the biggest obstacle to African firms exporting to China. “Supply reliability and structural bottlenecks”, such as the quality of logistics and red tape, are bigger choke-points, says Omar Bagersh, a coffee entrepreneur. Phytosanitary regulations have made it hard for farmers to export.

Ultimately Africa will maximise the benefits only if it can make more things that China wants to buy. Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University reckons zero tariffs could have a large impact “in a small number of middle-income countries” that already manufacture competitive goods. They may encourage Chinese firms to set up in the industrial zones China has been building in Africa to produce goods for exports back to China, rather than just for African markets. Yet ultimately “a more deliberate set of policies to include Africa in value chains” is needed, argues Carlos Lopes of the University of Cape Town.

The zero-tariff policy is a “political masterstroke” by China, says Joshua Eisenham of the University of Notre Dame, with China signalling that it is different from America under Donald Trump and committed to addressing trade imbalances. Wu Peng, China’s ambassador to South Africa, says it shows how “we will take real actions to contribute to Africa’s industrialisation and modernisation.” In an implicit contrast to America’s approach, he says that imposing heavy tariffs on African countries “is very unreasonable and sometimes brutal”.

Yet African countries are not about to give up on America. Since Mr Trump paused the tariffs he imposed on April 2nd they have been rushing to placate Washington. Governments are lining up like supplicants at a royal court to offer goodies. Most dangle a three-part package.

The first element is to roll the carpet out to American firms, most of all Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite-internet provider. Congo, which is keen to win American favour in its negotiations to end its war with Rwanda, signed such a deal in May. Lesotho, the tiny kingdom that faced a whopping 50% tariff, has also opened its market.

The second part of the offer is mining. Madagascar is pitching a uranium mine; South Africa is discussing chrome with American officials; Congo is welcoming American investment in a lithium mine; and Namibia is open to investment in a range of rare earths. If a deal ends up preventing Chinese ownership, all the better.

The third is to say that, even as their own citizens face possible bans, they will take migrants deported from America. Rwanda is dusting off the deal it struck with Britain to sell it to Team Trump. Lesotho, which depends on remittances from its own migrants to surrounding South Africa, is working on an offer.

All this points to a topsy-turvy irony in how the two great powers approach Africa. Having spent years criticising China—with much justification—for exploiting Africa’s natural resources and using its power to extract concessions in a transactional manner, America is now doing just that. That allows China, however cynically, to present itself as the benevolent partner.