As the Trump Administration attempts to broker deals to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, and as Russia has lost its Syria client (and its only warm water port outside the Black Sea), The Kremlin is quietly shifting military weight to the highly strategic Red Sea—through a planned naval base at Port Sudan, and potentially Benghazi, on the Mediterranean.

In February, the Sudanese Foreign Minister affirmed an agreement signed between Russia and Sudan back in 2020. This comes against the backdrop of Sudan’s ongoing civil war, pitting General Abdelfattah Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against Mohammed Dagalo’s (Hemedti) Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Meanwhile, Russia, Iran, and China have launched joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, demonstrating solidarity against U.S. pressure—particularly Trump’s recent, implied ultimatum to Iran regarding nuclear negotiations.

Russia’s Red-Med Bridge Strategy

Russia aims to establish a corridor of influence linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean through two key locations: Port Sudan and, potentially, Benghazi.

The Russian PMC (Private Military Company) Wagner Group had been active in both countries, which share a border. In 2017 (long before Wagner’s spectacular failed uprising in 2023), the group’s then-figurehead Yevgeny Prigozhin allegedly negotiated with Hemedti for a naval base at Port Sudan, offering mercenaries at discounted rates in exchange for gold concessions. Sudan agreed then to host four destroyers, for “defensive” purposes only.

Despite Russia’s support for Hemedti and the RSF, its port deal now appears to be advancing through the SAF (see above link), whose forces control Port Sudan and are (slowly) making gains on RSF-held Khartoum—suggesting that Moscow effectively hedged its bets by supporting both sides in the war. A potential settlement in Ukraine would free Russia to pursue a more aggressive positioning from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, spearheaded on land by a remade Wagner Group (the Afrika Corps).

Major Powers in Sudan: Competing Approaches

China and Russia

China and Russia are arguably the most influential external powers in Sudan, with China having more economic influence, and Russia greater military influence, as a supplier of arms and mercenaries. During the Cold War, Sudan and the USSR became estranged following a failed coup against Sudanese President Jaafar Al Nimeri. Since the late 1950s, China has maintained strong economic ties with Sudan, as the major investor in Sudan’s (read: now South Sudan’s) oil infrastructure (approx. $4 billion US). China currently holds stakes in Port Sudan facilities as well as the pipeline connecting it to the capital, Khartoum, and oilfields in South Sudan (see Fig. above)

Unlike Russia, China operates with a clear commercial strategy prioritizing trade and political stability through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This approach may eventually conflict with Russia’s focus on resource extraction, arms deals, and military projection, though currently both powers prioritize pushing back on U.S. dictates in the region.

Russia played a significant role in suppressing Red Sea piracy in the early 2010s but has remained notably silent about Houthi attacks following the Hamas-Israel conflict, suggesting to some that Putin may view the Houthis as potential leverage. Iran is thought to be supporting Burhan’s SAF, further complicating regional dynamics.

The recent joint Russia-China-Iran naval exercises clearly signal collective pushback against U.S. pressure, particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

Turkey and Qatar’s Stalled Ambitions for Suakin

Turkey and Qatar courted the former regime of Omar Al Bashir in the 2010s, winning bids to develop cultural/ real estate assets and port infrastructure at Suakin Island, a former regional Ottoman military base. While the current conflict has stalled these projects, both countries have tried to maintain engagement and visibility through peace initiatives and, more recently, humanitarian aid.

Both countries have supported political Islam in its various manifestations as a tool for strategic and economic influence. Saudi Arabia views Turkish, Qatari, and of course (ongoing) Iranian relations with Sudan and the SAF with concern, particularly given Port Sudan’s proximity to major Saudi cities (Jeddah) and “giga-projects” along the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia and UAE: Commercial-Strategic Approach

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long adopted strategies more aligned with China’s commercial focus than Russia’s military one. Both states (particularly the UAE) have invested heavily in port- and logistics-related infrastructure in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea littoral over the last two decades +, combining economic partnerships with security arrangements designed to counter Iranian proxies and Islamist expansion.

In 2022, Sudan and the UAE announced an $6 billion tourism, agriculture and industrial port development at a greenfield site dubbed Abu Amama, 200 km north of Port Sudan. In 2024, after the outbreak of war, the SAF cancelled the partnership, citing UAE support for Hemedti. The war has redirected UAE’s “Red-Med infrastructure” focus to the $35 billion Ra’s Al Hikma development in Egypt, 200 km west of Alexandria.

U.S. Strategy: Fragmented and Reactive

American strategy in the region remains disjointed. Since the 10/7 Hamas attacks (this is a particularly interesting link) on Israel, the US has focused, so far ineffectively, on brokering an Arab-Israeli peace deal that would include Saudi-Israeli normalization, joint regional containment of Iran, and a U.S.-Saudi defense and nuclear energy agreement. A breakthrough remains possible, but highly uncertain, and is likely dependent on the UAE and Saudi Arabia responding unconventionally to Trump’s challenge (See previous post).

Since January, U.S. attention beyond Israel-Hamas conflict (inclusive of military strikes against the Houthis in Yemen) has been on the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Somaliland. The Trump administration is considering recognition in exchange for a military base to complement Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.

Simultaneously, Trump has ordered repeated strikes against ISIS militants in the Golis mountain region that crosses Somaliland and Puntland. Puntland has seen a significant resurgence of ISIS activity in the last year.

All of this may please Ethiopia—which views Somaliland as its best prospect for Red Sea access—but will strain relations with Egypt and Somalia, both of which have longstanding tensions with Addis Ababa. Egypt perceives Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) an existential threat, to the degree that it degrades Egypt’s control over (and traditional ‘take’) of the Nile waters, which feed most of Egypt’s agriculture, consumable water and power needs.

Even if the U.S. sought to direct events in the Red Sea, it lacks the tools beyond military force to do so. America has no coherent Africa strategy, its diplomatic corps and regional expertise are being downsized, and its development assistance capacity has been drastically reduced. This decline predates the Trump administration but has accelerated under the current president.

The Stakes: A New Regional Order

The United States is being outmaneuvered in a multilateral competition by powers with deeper military, commercial, and economic investments and better understanding of regional dynamics. Despite America’s material and military capabilities, its actual influence continues to wane.

Russia’s foothold at Port Sudan represents more than just another military installation—it signals Moscow’s determination to reshape regional power dynamics as American influence recedes. With Russia positioned to influence shipping lanes, arms flows, and regional conflicts, the stability of the entire Red Sea corridor hangs in the balance.

The new scramble for the Red Sea is not only about ports and bases; it is about who will set the rules for one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints in the coming decades.

Normally, 12-15% of global trade, 30% of world containerized trade, 12% of global crude and 8% of global LNG moves through the waterway — the impact of recent lengthy disruptions has been cushioned by excess capacity — but this will not always be the case, and while projects like the IMEC (India-Middle East Corridor) will take some pressure off the Red Sea if implemented fully, other alternatives (like the so-called Arctic Route) are many years from being viable, and have other strategic and economic implications.

As Russia and China deepen their Red Sea presence, and Iran maintains its spoiler capabilities, the implications for global trade, regional security, and great power competition will reverberate far beyond the Horn of Africa.