As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters yet another bloody phase, and Trump seeks to block China’s access to parts of the global supply chain, could a transformational port-and-logistics project end the war in Gaza? The outline of this basic idea have been floating around for months and months, but for reasons both complex and predictable, the plan hasn’t yet found a place to land. Time is (still) ticking.

The Abraham Accords Framework: Lessons and Limitations

The 2020 Abraham Accords were widely framed as a paradigm-change in the traditional all-or-nothing, land-for-peace Arab approach to the Israel-Arab conflict. Following Israeli plans to annex parts of the West Bank, the UAE offered a trade: An Israeli moratorium on annexation, in exchange for normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, followed by parallel agreements with Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

This unorthodox plan came on the heels of what many saw as the Trump administration’s blank check to Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu. While there was compelling logic behind the Abraham Accords, the main embodied vulnerability was that it could not offer a quantifiable roadmap or timeline for realizing a Palestinian State—nor did it include consultations with the Palestinians, who were hostile to the deal from the start.

Saudi Arabia was then, and is even more so now, the lynchpin for the realization of the full package of anticipated benefits. The 10/7 Iran-backed Hamas massacre was timed to derail that rapprochement, which would have increased pressure on the Islamic Republic substantially. The Saudis are constrained by both Hamas and Israel’s atrocities, as they would now need what the first iteration lacked (a verifiable Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state) in order to carry through with any near-term normalization, for which the economic and security motivations are compelling.

Trump Administration Calculations

Will Trump ultimately rein in Netanyahu’s war machine to preside over an “Abraham II”? Does the US President really want to create Cancun sur Med, or is he waiting, as he intimated one point, for a bold counter-proposal from the Arab states — as happened with “Abraham I” in 2020?

Earlier this year, Egypt responded to “Trump Gaza,” as Trump’s proposal was dubbed, with a transitional plan that envisaged a role for the Palestinian Authority and no resettlement of Gazans — but permitted Hamas to remain in Gaza. This was unacceptable to stakeholders like the UAE, which insisted on the elimination of Hamas as a political force in Gaza. But the UAE and Saudi Arabia have something compelling to offer—the experience and capacity to build and fund a complete makeover of Gaza, in line with its historical economic and strategic advantage as a transshipment hub.

The UAE’s Port Development Model: A Blueprint for Gaza

The United Arab Emirates—a country that transformed itself from desert to global hub in a single generation—offers a masterclass in port-led economic and administrative development. The expertise extends beyond basic operations to encompass entire logistics networks and commercial ecosystems.

In the micro-state of Djibouti (before political complications led to a collapse of the UAE-Djibouti relationship in 2017), the UAE demonstrated how an underperforming port could be reinvented as a highly desirable and profitable regional hub. At the heart of success was the ‘triad’: close integration of port management, logistics infrastructure, and amenities (aka, the “high-end hotel factor”). Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” takes on a somewhat less inflammatory meaning when considered in this context.

A functioning port alone would change little, but an integrated maritime-facing economy—with logistics parks, processing facilities, renewable energy export capacity, and specialized service providers, all under technocratic governance divorced from past corruption—could generate thousands of jobs while advancing regional, local, and global trade integration, and helping meet the need for affordable, renewable energy.

The Strategic Case: Gaza as a Counter to China’s Maritime Influence

While the Trump administration has shown interest in controlling key maritime chokepoints through deals involving Panama Canal ports and Somalia’s coastal facilities, developing Gaza as a Mediterranean hub offers a more compelling strategic case. Rather than merely denying China access to existing ports, a Gaza development initiative would create an entirely new node in regional trade networks that naturally aligns with American interests.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) derives much of its appeal from combining infrastructure development with economic opportunity. A Gaza port development strategy could mirror this approach while remaining firmly within a U.S.-led framework. More importantly, it would deliver concrete results in a region where China has made significant inroads, offering a demonstrable American alternative to Beijing’s development model.

Unlike scattered port acquisitions that serve mainly defensive purposes (keeping China out), a Gaza development initiative would proactively reshape regional trade flows while solving one of the world’s most intractable conflicts—delivering a diplomatic win alongside strategic advantage.

Gaza’s Strategic Potential

Historically, Gaza’s location at the intersection of Red Sea, North African, and Mediterranean trade routes provides natural advantages as a transshipment point. While current discussions focus primarily on security and political dimensions, Gaza’s potential for economic revitalization through port development deserves serious consideration.

A port-logistics-amenity-focused approach could evolve Gaza into a specialized economic zone that has much to offer broader regional trade initiatives, such as the India-Middle East Trade Corridor (IMEC)—a multi-modal logistics corridor moving goods from the Far East, across Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, to the Mediterranean (the IMEC was conceived in part to draw India closer to the West, than China).

The Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Environmental NGO EcoPeace last year introduced the idea of a Peace Triangle to boost IMEC’s benefits while facilitating economic and energy interdependencies between the Territories, Israel, and the Gulf states. By adding a ‘Gaza spur’ to IMEC, renewable energy produced in Jordan (and funded by the Emirates) could be exported not only via Haifa but also via Gaza.

This concept supports building Gaza as a regional transshipment hub and connects to other Gulf initiatives, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s gigaprojects in Egypt (Ras Al Hikma) and the upper Red Sea (NEOM). These could become nodes in a virtuous regional economic web, with closer integration benefiting all participants and bringing greater stability—precisely the logic that drove the original Abraham Accords.

Obstacles To Overcome

Several challenges may yet be fatal to this vision. Israel’s right-wing coalition government is one; the fact that it is led by a Prime Minister motivated by personal, rather than national interest, is another. The perception among many Israelis that Palestinians can never be trusted to control transportation infrastructure — lest Gaza become an arms depot — is a third. And there remains the imperative to address Israel’s legitimate security concerns, while offering Palestinians a technocratic, commercial, professional government distinct from both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.

With pressure that only the United States—possibly only someone with Trump’s transactional worldview—can produce, both Israeli and Palestinian political actors could be compelled to comply with a comprehensive solution. Israel must exit Gaza and hand over governance to an interim authority overseen by regional allies; Hamas must leave Gaza under some form of amnesty after hostage release. This sequence is highly time-sensitive and requires comprehensive rather than piecemeal implementation.

From Vision to Reality: A Gaza Development Strategy

What would it take to transform Gaza from devastation to prosperity? A port-centered development strategy requires several specific components working in concert to create a sustainable economic ecosystem.

The transformation could begin with multilateral oversight to establish an international interim governance framework, something akin to an ‘Arab+ mandate’, including consultations with European powers, and the Israeli government. This structure would provide both the transparency Israel requires and the sovereignty Palestinians deserve. This arrangement might draw inspiration from early development models in Hong Kong or Singapore, adapting their success to Mediterranean realities.

Technical infrastructure would form the backbone of this new Gaza, incorporating e-government systems, advanced scanning technologies, and blockchain-based cargo tracking. These innovations would build governance capabilities while satisfying legitimate security concerns, enabling commerce to flow without compromising safety. The technology exists—what’s missing is the political will to implement it.

Knowledge transfer programs would leverage Gaza’s high education rates and underemployed university graduates. Technical training in port management, logistics, and maritime operations could rapidly create a skilled workforce ready for global integration. This approach builds hope while providing concrete alternatives to extremism through meaningful employment opportunities.

Regional connectivity would position Gaza’s port as complementary rather than competitive with other regional facilities. By becoming a specialized node within emerging trade corridors, Gaza could offer unique value through processing and transshipment services between Europe, Africa, and Asia. Its role would be defined by specialization rather than scale.

Educational investment through initiatives like a Gaza Maritime Academy would build long-term capacity while providing immediate paths forward for young Palestinians. By creating institutions focused on practical skills with global applications, Gaza’s future generations would gain access to productive careers beyond the cycle of conflict.

Beyond Zero-Sum Thinking

For too long, Gaza has been viewed primarily through incompatible security and political lenses, with economic development and integration treated as an afterthought. This sequence needs reversing—economic vitality creates the conditions for security and political stability. While this was arguably part of the Abraham I ethos, a second paradigm shift is needed.

Security through prosperity means recognizing that unemployment and despair pose greater long-term security risks than economic openness. Governance through mutually reinforcing and inter-dependent stakes, not force creates structures in which stability and growth are in everyone’s interest. A priority on integration over isolation replaces an approach of “containment” with “connectivity”, binding Gaza inextricably to local and regional trade networks. Capacity building as conflict prevention means investing in Gaza’s human capital to provide tangible alternatives to extremism.

An Opportunity Like No Other

A Gaza port development initiative represents a unique opportunity for the Trump administration to advance multiple strategic wins simultaneously. Framing peace as an investment dividend offers a pathway that notionally aligns with Trump’s deal-making approach while delivering concrete results where traditional diplomacy has failed.

While Beijing’s influence grows through infrastructure investments across the region, a U.S.-backed Gaza initiative would offer a direct counter-narrative with tangible benefits: reducing extremism, securing Israel, ending a catastrophic war and humanitarian crisis, stabilizing a volatile region, and creating a new node in Western-aligned trade networks.

Unlike defensive maneuvers to block Chinese port acquisitions elsewhere (note recent high visibility administration initiatives aimed at controlling Chinese access to the Panama Canal, and the lower Red Sea), a Gaza development strategy has the potential to proactively reshape regional trade flows, while demonstrating American leadership through tangible results — rather than merely denying access to competitors.

For Trump specifically, this approach offers something previous administrations lacked: a transactional framework that aligns diverse interests rather than attempting to resolve intractable ideological disputes. The fact that it would simultaneously advance American strategic interests while delivering a historic peace achievement may be particularly appealing to the President.

While the underpinnings of this approach may not match traditional, or ideal, visions of American global power projection, it could potentially generate game-changing progress in a region notoriously resistant to change, and which has drawn the United States into countless, expensive and politically divisive conflicts over the years — while constructively outmaneuvering China in the strategic competition for maritime influence.