Courtesy of Clingendael China Center, analysis of a recent announcement that Vladivostok will become a transit port for Chinese shipments:

Historically, during the Qing Dynasty, Vladivostok and its surrounding area belonged to China. However, the Convention of Peking in 1860 resulted in the territory being ceded to Russia, thereby severing China’s direct access to the Sea of Japan. Since then, Russia has been cautious about Chinese involvement in the region, fearing any potential attempts by China to reclaim Vladivostok. But with ever more sanctions disrupting its economy, Russia needs to keep any friend it still has; it cannot afford to be too wary anymore.

On May 16, Chinese state media announced that Vladivostok would become a transit point for domestic Chinese trade. The way this news was worded says a lot. An article in the China Daily quoted experts as saying: “China’s move to add Vladivostok as a cross-border transit port for domestic trade shipments will further bolster economic growth in its northeastern region.” The phrase “China’s move,” appears to imply it was a unilateral Chinese decision.

It is important to note that the transit deal involving Vladivostok is limited to domestic Chinese trade and exclusively pertains to shipments originating from Jilin province. Jilin is a northeastern province of China that shares borders with Russia and North Korea. Historically, Jilin formed part of the Dongbei region, which also includes Liaoning and Heilongjiang provinces. The Dongbei region used to be heavily reliant on inefficient, state-owned heavy industries, and its economy suffered significantly during China’s Reform and Opening-Up policy in the early 1980s.

As a result, the region experienced a prolonged period of decline and became known as “China’s Rust Belt.” In 2003, the central government initiated the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan, with the aim of modernizing the region’s economy. This plan has been largely successful, leading to greater economic diversification. Jilin has expanded its agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors, launched significant shale-oil and mining projects, and upgraded its industrial sector.

However, transportation has always been a challenge for Jilin. Since the Convention of Peking, the province has been landlocked, with the nearest major seaport located in Dalian, Liaoning Province. Dalian is located on a strategic position on the Bohai Strait, connecting the Bohai Sea with the Korea Bay and the Yellow Sea. This location made it a focal point for foreign invasions; from 1895 to 1955, Dalian and its surrounding area witnessed multiple control shifts between Japan and Russia/The Soviet Union.

Historically, goods from Jilin had to be transported by road and railway to Dalian, a distance of up to eight hundred kilometers, before being shipped to other ports across China. This transportation process is expensive and time-consuming. In contrast, Vladivostok is merely 180 kilometers away from the Chinese border in Jilin. China has attempted to negotiate agreements with both Russia and North Korea since the mid-2000s to utilize ports for shipments from the Dongbei region, but these efforts have yielded limited success—until now.

Initially, China plans to utilize the existing infrastructure of Vladivostok’s port for shipments from Jilin to other parts of China. However, there are also plans for the development of a new transit port and joint Chinese-Russian efforts in “port construction and logistics development.” It remains uncertain whether this would eventually enable China to use Vladivostok for exports. At present, such a scenario may seem unlikely for Russia, but with the rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics, the Kremlin’s stance may evolve in the near future.

On May 24, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin of the Russian Federation paid a visit to Beijing, where he held meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. The discussions resulted in both countries agreeing to enhance their trade relations and strengthen cooperation across various frameworks, including the Eurasian Economic Union, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the G20. Chinese state media reported a substantial increase in bilateral trade between January and April, amounting to $73.1 billion, marking a significant 41.3 percent year-on-year growth. This positive trend is expected to continue its upward trajectory with the recent Vladivostok transit-deal, which will serve as a catalyst for even higher trade volumes.