In a portentous marker of the second anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, officials from the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs last month tweeted a photo from a meeting with visiting executives from China’s Huawei Technologies.

The tweet, on the social media platform now known as X, was later removed. But days later, the ministry announced that it was in the process of installing a network of 62,000 surveillance cameras around the capital and other areas “to improve security.” Huawei was not explicitly mentioned, but the company is well known for its work on “smart city” systems for law enforcement agencies and other government departments.

The mixed signals from the ministry point up how a degree of uneasiness persists between the Taliban and Beijing even as China emerges as Kabul’s most important supporter on the world stage. This backing was highlighted again on Wednesday when China became the first country to name a new ambassador to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover.

Indeed, the two sides so far appear to have found a “win-win” formula for working together, with the Taliban only too eager to welcome prospective Chinese investors.

In April, Acting Mining Minister Shahabuddin Delawar was said to have met with representatives of a Chinese company called Gochin about exploiting Afghanistan’s rich lithium deposits. The ministry said that the company was looking to invest $10 billion, create around 120,000 jobs and build various needed infrastructure. Although the ministry produced a photo of the meeting, the Chinese company is otherwise unknown.

Two weeks ago, Delawar held a public ceremony for the signing of mining contracts with another obscure Chinese company and others from Iran, Turkey and the U.K. The seven deals were said to involve a total of $6.5 billion in investment.

For now, state-owned Metallurgical Corporation of China remains on record for Afghanistan’s largest contracted investment. The company signed a deal in 2007, when the Taliban were out of power, to put at least $3 billion into a copper mine at Mes Aynak, a site southeast of Kabul known for its ancient Buddhist ruins. Development remains stalled, however, despite public calls from Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and other senior Afghan officials for work to proceed.

Chinese state companies and various levels of government have sent aid to Afghanistan. According to calculations by aid research group ACAPS, this support totaled $50 million over the last two years — a sum that ranks China near the bottom of Afghanistan’s top 10 donors, notwithstanding the attention China draws toward it.

Moreover, while Taliban officials have publicly expressed interest in joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative, likely in the hopes of drawing new investment and financial support, Beijing appears to be taking its time with this request.

Beijing has reasons to hesitate. Last December, Islamic State Khorasan bombed a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul just days after the Chinese ambassador had met with Taliban officials to request increased security around Chinese sites.

Most meetings with Chinese officials include a call for the Taliban to take action against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, an umbrella name used by Beijing for Uyghur militants gathered in Afghanistan. While there were reports early in their administration that the Taliban had moved some groups away from Chinese border areas, it is not clear how effective this strategy has actually been in controlling the militants.

Notwithstanding these issues, both Beijing and Kabul seem broadly happy with how the relationship is developing.

Chinese diplomats have become among the most vocal advocates for the Taliban in public forums, regularly lobbying others to recognize the movement’s authority although Beijing itself has not done so formally. Notably, when China took over the rotating presidency of the U.N. Security Council in September 2022, it marked the occasion by sending jars of Afghan pine nuts to other members of the council. Similarly, Taliban officials have publicly offered support for Chinese priorities, such as the “One China” principle, which posits that Beijing holds sovereignty over Taiwan.

Smaller-scale investments have also been proceeding amid the uncertainty about Mes Aynak. In July, Delawar, the acting mining minister, presided over a ceremony in northern Sar-e Pol province as China’s Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas began pumping oil. The company pledged in January to invest $540 million in the field’s development.

And although Afghanistan’s membership in the BRI is still unsettled, the country appears to be winning gradual inclusion in the related China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Earlier this year, Pakistan Railway and state-owned China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group issued construction tenders for construction of a rail line between Karachi and Mazar-e-Sharif, the economic hub of northern Afghanistan.

Beijing is happy for private Chinese companies to move into Afghanistan. Many, though, are finding that even though security has improved with the end of the country’s civil war, operating in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is not easy.

More state-backed projects are likely to move forward as Chinese executives figure out ways to work with the Taliban. Lithium exploration could be a promising area in this regard.

But some in Beijing undoubtedly worry that Afghanistan is unlikely to offer a better investment environment than neighboring Pakistan. Islamabad has long been keen on Chinese investment, but its promises to provide a secure environment ring all too hollow and its financial struggles bring other problems. Beijing is unlikely to stake anywhere as much in Afghanistan as it has in Pakistan, but it does not want to get sucked into a sinkhole either.

Beijing is thus likely to continue to proceed slowly in Afghanistan, even if things are going reasonably well for the moment. For their part, the Taliban are getting a lot of what they want out of China too.

The relationship remains marinated in mistrust, but it has blossomed into one of Kabul’s most significant relationships on the world stage. Whether Beijing is prepared for the potential responsibilities that might come with that in the longer term remains to be seen.