Over the past decade, the UAE has become Africa’s fourth largest foreign investor, behind China, the EU and the US. Between 2012 and 2022, the UAE injected $60bn into the continent in infrastructure, energy, agro-food, telecommunications and transport.

The petrol-driven monarchy has become a key player in the Horn of Africa and several other African countries. For Eleonora Ardemagni, a Middle East expert at the Italy-based ISPI, the UAE is “the only country capable of competing with China in both East and West Africa”.

This rise of the UAE in Africa coincides with the rise of Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, better known as MBZ, after he replaced his half-brother Khalifa, who suffered a stroke, as president of the UAE in 2014 and officially succeeded him in 2022, also becoming emir of Abu Dhabi.

The UAE controls more than half of the ports in East Africa

Since 1993, the man dubbed the “Gulf Hawk” has been the commander of the UAE Armed Forces (before becoming minister of defence) and gradually emerged as the strongman of the Arabian Peninsula.

What is the Emirati Africa policy?

The birth of a true Emirati “African policy” goes back about 15 years, “motivated by the opportunities offered by the continent, it primarily serves the UAE’s commercial interests and addresses their food security needs,” says Jean-Loup Samaan, a research associate at the IFRI (French Institute for International Relations).

Thus, under MBZ’s leadership, the UAE has become a kind of “new medieval Venice” with an “imperial policy,” according to Sébastien Boussois, a political science doctor and author of The United Arab Emirates Conquering the World.

For MBZ, Africa is seen as a means to ensure the survival of its state, a reservoir of resources and a potential zone of influence. As a telling figure, 60% of the DRC’s mining exports are directed to the UAE and China.

Ports come first in UAE deal

Since 2006, the cornerstone of this policy and the UAE’s economic ambitions has been port concessions through two companies: DP World, based in Dubai, and Abu Dhabi Ports Group, based in Abu Dhabi.

DP World – which controls 87 ports in 40 countries worldwide – and Abu Dhabi Ports Group have a strong presence in East Africa (Tanzania, Somaliland, Mozambique, Sudan, Djibouti, Puntland) but also in Rwanda, Congo, Angola, Senegal, Guinea, as well as in South Africa, Algeria and Egypt.

“The UAE controls more than half of the ports in East Africa, including five in Mozambique, ensuring their strategic influence in the Red Sea,” notes Cameron Hudson, a veteran of the CIA and security specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

With the UAE’s economy partially reliant on trade and import-export, this “port chain strategy” allows the UAE to access African markets and act as a “super hub” between Africa and Asia.

It also serves the UAE’s food sovereignty, as they depend on imports for 85% of their needs, making them one of the leading buyers of farmland in Africa, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi holds lands in Nigeria, Namibia, Morocco, Ghana and Sudan (400,000 hectares).

New Venice or New Sparta?

In 2023, Sheikh Ahmed Dalmook Al Maktoum, a member of Dubai’s ruling family and the second leader of the emirate, signed an unprecedented memorandum of understanding with Liberia, granting exclusive rights to one million hectares of forests to his company Blue Carbon LLC for 30 years, representing 10% of this West African country’s area.

The same company has made similar agreements with Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, promising to convert their lands into carbon credits, which some NGOs consider greenwashing and a form of colonialism.

Likewise, the UAE, suffering from water stress, seeks to establish political and economic influence in countries along the Nile route, particularly Ethiopia, the UAE’s grain supplier, whose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is a protégé of MBZ.

Yemen war changes priorities

However, the UAE’s African policy has evolved according to MBZ’s geopolitical interests. Since the Arab Spring of 2011 and the war in Yemen against the Houthis, in which the UAE participated alongside Saudi Arabia starting in 2015, its priorities have focused on political, security and military elements.

“Three factors contributed to this shift: concern over popular uprisings in some Arab countries, escalating tensions between Abu Dhabi’s ruling family and the Al Islah movement – the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to its ban in 2014 – and finally, the consolidation of MBZ’s power internally (with the central axis being the fight against political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran).

This combination triggered unprecedented Emirati regional activism and unapologetic use of power, in stark contrast to previous decades,” says Jean-Loup Samaan. Under MBZ, the UAE has transformed into the new Sparta of the Gulf, the ancient Greek city-state known for its military strength.

To secure its supply routes and have a base for operations towards the Yemeni coast, MBZ organised military deployments in the Horn of Africa, notably at the port of Assab in Eritrea, until 2021, and to a lesser extent at the port of Berbera in Somaliland.

Backing Hemeti and the rebel RSF army

MBZ has also adopted a more aggressive and coercive approach, conditioning investments on African leaders aligning with their interests, and often supporting military establishments hostile to Islamists: in Libya with Marshal Haftar (until a reversal in 2019), in Egypt, Mauritania, Chad and Sudan.

For more than a decade, MBZ and his brother, Mansour bin Zayed, UAE vice president, have staunchly supported Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, since April 2023. The SAF and the RSF have both committed violations of international human rights and humanitarian law throughout the war.

In 2019, Sheikh Tahnoun, UAE National Security Advisor, brother of MBZ and known as “Mr Business” in Africa, provided Hemeti with a private jet from his company Royal Jet to travel across the continent and legitimise his opposition to Burhan.

Although both warring parties have committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law across Sudan, the RSF is responsible for numerous massacres and atrocities in Darfur, displacing around 5.3 million people, including some 400,000 who fled to Chad. According to a UN report, under the guise of humanitarian missions, the UAE delivered weapons to the RSF via the Amdjarass airport, a town in Chad near the Sudanese border, countering the SAF’s air force.

Hemeti has become Sudan’s richest man by supplying thousands of mercenaries to the UAE in their war in Yemen, and later to Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya. The Dagalo family also controls gold mining areas in Darfur.

Most of this gold is illicitly sold to refiners in Dubai, where Hemeti’s younger brother, who manages the family fortune, resides. Despite this, the UAE denies any interference. “They do so by spending enormous amounts of money on lobbying, public relations and charity programmes, mainly in Sudan and Darfur, to clean up their image,” says Hudson.

MBZ also uses his ‘port influence’, for example, when Mozambique presided over the UN Security Council in May, the Sudanese government requested a meeting to discuss the UAE’s support for the RSF. “But since the UAE controls all the ports in Mozambique, they asked them not to accede to this request,” he adds.

Abu Dhabi, a disruptive element in Africa?

The UAE’s image in Africa is complex. In 2018, DP World – which managed the port of Doraleh (Djibouti) since 2006 – was expelled by Djiboutian authorities in the name of “the country’s sovereignty”.

The reason? Covert commissions paid for years to Abdourahman Boreh, president of the Ports and Free Zones Authority from 2003 to 2008, who has since taken refuge in Dubai.

In 2020, the Emirati company Black Shield caused outrage in Sudan. Under the guise of offering security guard positions to young Sudanese, it sent them to wartorn countries, including Libya.

The UAE’s all-out opportunism in Africa may reflect a lack of long-term vision, which has had devastating geopolitical consequences in the Horn of Africa.

In 2018, MBZ orchestrated the end of the 20-year state of war between Ethiopia, led by Abiy, and Eritrea, led by Isaias Afwerki. The emir met with both leaders before, during and after the reconciliation process, which saw the signing of a peace treaty in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Eritrea – which has made military concessions to Gulf monarchies since the Yemen war – sought to escape its diplomatic and economic isolation.

Drones save Abiy during TPLF war

Ethiopia, which pledges allegiance to Abu Dhabi, has offered the UAE privileged access to its resources. But this alliance between former enemies turned into armed conflict against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), with the support of Emirati drones.

These drones also saved Abiy, threatened by rebel columns in 2021. Following this, International Golden Group (IGG), the Emirati defence conglomerate – reportedly 60% owned by MBZ and Sheikh Tahnoun – sent a team to Addis Ababa to evaluate potential arms sales.

This group also served as a front for shipping weapons to Libya in 2011 to support rebels against Muammar Gaddafi, and later to Haftar. In 2023, Ethiopia signed a $6bn deal involving 113 Emirati projects.

The UAE also maintains an ambiguous relationship with Somalia, partly because Abu Dhabi implicitly recognises the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland. In early January, the UAE facilitated an agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, giving Addis Ababa direct access to the sea.

In exchange, Ethiopia committed to recognising this “state”. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, despite being close to the UAE, has seen this as an attack on his country’s sovereignty.

The UAE has significant military and economic interests in Somalia. The Emirati army also trains Somali soldiers, primarily to strengthen their fight against local Islamist extremists, the Shebabs, who claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on 10 February at a base in Mogadishu, killing four officers from the Emirates.