As Beijing prepares for the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), scheduled to take place from September 4 to 6, there is a sense of anticipation about what the summit will bring. Established in 2000 at the request of African nations seeking greater coordination with China, FOCAC has evolved into a key framework for dialogue and collaboration between China and Africa. Held every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African country as host, the summit is expected to draw a substantial number of African heads of state; 2018 summit in Beijing had over 50 African top leaders and representatives of African organizations in attendance.

FOCAC is central to China’s engagement with Africa, particularly in making development pledges that span economic, political, and social domains. These commitments are typically organized around thematic priority areas, such as health, agricultural development, trade and investment, industrial cooperation, infrastructure, green development, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. Financial commitments, a hallmark of FOCAC conferences, often capture the most attention – such as the $60 billion in new financing announced in 2018 and the $40 billion pledge in 2021. These commitments reflect the scale and scope of China’s engagement with the continent. 

While the core focus areas of cooperation – agriculture, trade, industrial cooperation, and infrastructure – have been consistent over the years, FOCAC has also adapted to emerging global challenges. As an example, the 2021 conference emphasized health and vaccine cooperation in response to the pandemic, with an increasing focus on green development and climate collaboration as well. However, despite the broad scope of topics covered at FOCAC, one crucial area remains notably underrepresented: mining and critical minerals. 

This oversight is surprising, given China’s strategic interest in critical minerals and the mining sector’s significance to African economies. Minerals account for an average of 70 percent of total African exports and about 28 percent of the continent’s GDP. Nearly 90 percent of Chinese imports from Africa consist of mineral fuels, ores, stones, metals, and other minerals.

Moreover, the mining sector is a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Mining represents the second-largest share of Chinese FDI on the continent at 23.8 percent, surpassed only by the construction sector. 

Africa holds approximately 30 percent of global mineral resources, many of which are critical minerals – essential components for the green-energy transition, defense systems, and other high-tech applications. The International Energy Agency predicts that global demand for critical minerals used in clean energy technologies – such as lithium, copper, cobalt, and nickel for batteries – will double by 2030. Thus, the mining of critical minerals presents a unique opportunity for economic growth and industrialization on the continent, as well as a strategic interest for China, which is heavily invested in securing these resources for its industries.

China holds a dominant position in many critical minerals value chains, including rare earth elements, copper, graphite and lithium. China has a significant advantage in mineral processing and downstream manufacturing. For instance, in the electric vehicle (EV) industry, while Australia leads in lithium production, Indonesia in nickel, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in cobalt, and China in graphite, China controls more than half of the processing for these minerals. In the downstream stage, China manufactures three-quarters of all lithium-ion batteries and produces over half of the world’s EVs. 

China’s dominance has raised concerns among the United States and its allies, which are actively seeking to reduce their dependency on China in critical minerals and clean technology supply chains. In 2022, the U.S., European Union, and their allies formed the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a coalition of 15 countries and regions aiming to diversify sustainable critical energy minerals supply chains. The MSP has a clear intent to curb China’s dominance. 

In 2023, Australia blocked the acquisition of a lithium mine by a Chinese mining company. This year, both the United States and the EU imposed high tariffs on Chinese EVs, with the U.S. levying a 100 percent tariff and the EU imposing tariffs of up to 37.6 percent.

Amid this great power competition, all parties are eyeing Africa’s critical mineral resources. The EU has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with four African countries (Namibia, the DRC, Zambia, and Rwanda) to strengthen partnerships for critical raw materials value chains. Meanwhile, the U.S. has signed a trilateral MoU with the DRC and Zambia to support the supply chain development for EV batteries. Both the EU and U.S. have also committed to supporting the development of the Lobito Corridor, which links Lobito Port in Angola to mining regions in the DRC and Zambia, facilitating the transport of critical minerals to markets in Europe and North America. However, these MoUs have yet to be translated into tangible investment targets or financing actions.

In contract, China has moved faster, as its approach tends to be more output-focused, characterized by quick decision-making and implementation. In 2021 and 2022 alone, Chinese companies invested over $1 billion in acquiring lithium projects in Zimbabwe. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence estimated that more than 90 percent of Africa’s forecasted lithium supply in 2024 will come from projects at least partly owned by Chinese firms. In cobalt and copper, China also owns substantial stakes in mines in the DRC. Chinese investments in these countries are going beyond mere extraction to include increased investment in mineral processing. 

In addition, in February 2024, China proposed a $1 billion refurbishment plan for the Tazara Railway, which it originally built in the 1970s connecting Zambia’s Copperbelt region with the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. This project directly competes with the Lobito Corridor in facilitating the movement of critical minerals from Zambia and the DRC. 

Meanwhile, African nations are striving to move beyond being mere sources of raw materials. They are asserting their interest in value addition and developing local processing capacities to capture a fairer share of profits along the critical mineral value chains. Several African countries – including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ghana, and Nigeria – have banned the export of raw critical materials, such as lithium, bauxite, and rare earth elements, in a bid to promote local value addition. Another notable development is the agreement between the DRC and Zambia to jointly develop EV batteries using locally extracted minerals. 

As global demand and competition for critical minerals intensify, the mineral relations between Africa and China is likely to become even more intertwined. While China seeks Africa’s resources and markets, Africa equally requires China’s expertise, technology, and human resources. However, African nations must be proactive in asserting their interests to ensure fair terms that maximize benefits for their economies and citizens. Measures such as imposing raw export bans, demanding investment in local value addition, and renegotiating mining contracts are steps in the right direction. 

Yet, bilateral negotiations alone will not suffice. To secure a more equitable partnership, African nations must adopt a unified approach, negotiating collectively to ensure their development priorities are respected and advanced. FOCAC presents an ideal platform for African countries to voice their collective demands and secure China’s commitment to key agendas, including industrialization through value addition, infrastructure investment, and improved alignment with Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards.

It remains to be seen whether the upcoming FOCAC summit will formally include critical minerals cooperation in its agenda. Regardless of the outcome, it is evident that critical minerals will continue to play a significant role in Africa-China economic relations. More dialogue is needed for African nations to ensure that this partnership remains dynamic, equitable, and responsive to the evolving global landscape.