In a move that might ease simmering tensions in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has disclosed that it is planning to offer Ethiopia “100% access” to the Tadjoura port.

• The access would see Ethiopia directly manage the port, Djibouti’s foreign minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf said during a recent media interview.
• The offer comes in light of simmering tensions triggered by Ethiopia’s aspirations about regaining access to the sea.
• Addis Ababa currently uses both Tajdourah port and the Port of Djibouti, but its move to sign a pact with the breakaway region of Somaliland has triggered regional tensions.

Although details of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland are still scanty, several elements have been confirmed by the two sides. The major point is that Somaliland would allow Ethiopia to use part of its coast for its navy, and in turn, Somaliland would get a stake in state-owned enterprises, primarily Ethiopia Airlines.

Whether the deal combines both commercial and military uses is unclear, but a highly controversial element of the implied deal is that Ethiopia promised to officially recognise Somaliland “at some point in the future.” The two historical issues -Ethiopia’s desire for access to the sea and Somaliland’s status-are playing out on the regional scene with a high risk of escalation as different players pull from different ends.

Ethiopia has forces fighting Al Shabaab in Somalia, under the African Union, so any military escalation would have far reaching consequences for regional security. For Somalia, the territorial issue is also historical, especially where Ethiopia is concerned.

The Web of Alliances

For regional watchers, a solution that lowers tensions and works for all sides would be most ideal. But the conflict triggered by Addis’ plans, which are a modification of a similar deal that fell through in 2017, has already drawn external players with other motives. They are largely divided into two sides led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, similar to the support lines in the ongoing Sudan conflict. Mogadishu has also roped in Ethiopia’s rival Egypt. Cairo and Addis Ababa do not see eye to eye over the latter’s GERD dam, with the former taking advantage of the ongoing tensions to build relationships with Mogadishu and Eritrea as it seeks allies in the Horn. It recently sent equipment and personnel to Somalia, a move that further inflamed the conflict and saw Ethiopia send an ambassador to Hargeisa.

The brewing conflict has also roped in Turkey, Somalia’s ally, which has tried to mediate between the parties. Other players such as Saudi Arabia have also defended Somalia’s territorial integrity, but the fear has been that Ethiopia is willing to use force to get access to the sea, and that for PM Abiy Ahmed, the diplomatic cost of recognising Somaliland in exchange for restoring access to the sea may be a small price to pay. But the shifting alliances, Abiy’s former ally Eritrea, whose breakaway lost Ethiopia access to the sea in 1993, is firmly on Somalia’s side.

While Kenya has tried to mediate the conflict between its two neighbours, the close relationship between Nairobi and Addis, and a host of underlying issues in Nairobi’s relationship with Mogadishu mean that it did not make much headway. This is might partially be because Nairobi has its own territorial dispute with Somalia, over a maritime border on the Indian Ocean. The many overlapping interests may also complicate any attempts at finding a solution that does not include conflict, which makes Djibouti’s offer, and its timing, important.

It is also clear that Djibouti City’s move is not driven by mere altruism. If the Somaliland deal goes through, it would lose a lot in the revenue it generates from being Ethiopia’s access to the sea. It has also invested a lot in both its port and a road linking to Ethiopia, and would want to see the investments pay off. Addis Ababa has had concerns about the Djibouti route, including red tape and cost implications of its only route to the sea. Its motivations, beyond regaining access, may be driven by the need to find a ‘permanent’ solution that is not as expensive as its current option, and one with military purposes embedded would help Addis shore up its regional military standing.