Ethiopia and Somalia have agreed to de-escalate yearlong tensions in Türkiye-mediated negotiations resulting in the Ankara Declaration. The two countries agreed to forgo contentious issues, cooperate in mutually advantageous bilateral arrangements, and decided to finalize negotiations within four months with the facilitation of Türkiye.

Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia escalated in January 2024 following a controversial deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which granted Ethiopia access to a naval base in return for recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Somalia, angered by the deal, expelled Ethiopian diplomats, pushed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops under the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and agreed to the deployment of Egyptian forces in their stead, risking further destabilization of the already volatile Horn of Africa region.

Dialling down this confrontation is a positive development for the two war-torn nations. Ethiopia is embroiled in armed conflict in the Amhara and Oromia regions amid implementing painful economic reforms. Somalia is struggling to assert authority in combating Al-Shabaab and facing armed confrontations from semi-autonomous Puntland and Jubaland regional states. It also eased concerns at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – where the UN, AU, and member states have agreed on a resolution replacing the ATMIS with the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). IGAD, the African Union, the USA, and the European Union welcomed the deal and encouraged Ethiopia and Somalia to intensify their mutual security interests while commending Türkiye.

However, uncertainties regarding the implementation of the declaration carry potential regional risks. Somalia’s rejection of Ethiopian troops in ATMIS amid increasing Egyptian influence in Somali security remains a bone of contention. Days after signing the declaration, Ethiopian and Somali troops clashed in the border town of Doolow in Somalia’s Jubaland state threatening to upend the deal. Ethiopia’s unresolved Red Sea strategic interests also risk renewed tensions with Eritrea. Türkiye’s increasing strategic presence in the Horn of Africa entails rivalry with Egypt and UAE over economic and security alliances in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, leaving implementation uncertain. The incoming Trump administration’s stance on Somaliland’s statehood may further complicate the regional dynamics.

Deciphering the declaration: Ethiopia’s strategic dilemma

The declaration does not directly address Ethiopia’s quest for a maritime base on the Red Sea. It omits any mention of a military base or maritime security arrangements and stipulates the commitment of the two countries for future talks to “finalize mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” in Somalia’s ports.

Some observers argue that the declaration is a win for Ethiopia and Prime Minister Abiy as a means to gain access to the sea via Somalia. However, Ethiopia already accesses the Red Sea via Djibouti’s ports and Somaliland’s Berbera port. With no functional naval military capability, Ethiopia faces the problem of guaranteed direct access to the sea and protecting its maritime interests in a troubled region.

The declaration underscores respect for territorial integrity, unity, and sovereignty of the two countries technically nullifying the deal Ethiopia made with Somaliland. Somalia put the suspension of the Somaliland agreement as a precondition for talks. Two previous indirect meetings in Ankara were derailed over this sticking point. Abiy and his delegation reportedly conceded to Somalia’s demand under pressure from the US and President Erdogan. In turn, Somalia acknowledged the sacrifice of Ethiopian troops in the fight against al Shabaab.

Abiy succeeded in bringing Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as an agenda to the international stage, but it came at steep reputational and strategic cost. Seen from a realist perspective, Abiy’s push for direct access carries some merit. However, by making it the centrepiece of his regional foreign policy, Abiy has complicated matters. Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland was a drastic shift away from previous Ethiopian administrations’ cautious approach to Somaliland’s independence. They preferred port diversification and regional economic integration as a strategy, managing to acquire a stake at Berbera port in 2017 with less fanfare and muted backlash from Mogadishu. Abiy’s overtures in Somalia reflect the continuation of his preference for a populist, personalized, and transactional foreign policy approach.

Renewed tensions with Eritrea

Ethiopia’s lack of direct sea access, a consequence of Eritrea’s secession in 1993, remains a longstanding grievance. With uncertainties over a maritime base on the Somali coast and the deal with Somaliland nullified, tensions over the Eritrean port of Assab are likely to resurface.

Assab port map. Credit: Alamy

Ethiopian authorities’ heightened rhetoric regarding access to the Red Sea in early 2024 risked military escalation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Once allies, Prime Minister Abiy and President Isais no longer see eye to eye following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement that ended the Tigray war.

Recent events in both capitals indicate the risk of renewed tensions. In October, Eritrea hosted and signed a tripartite security agreement with the leaders of Egypt and Somalia, causing concerns in Addis. In a recent interview, President Isaias criticized Ethiopia’s Federal system and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) accusing Ethiopia of destabilizing the region with the backing of unnamed actors. In response, Ethiopian state media criticized Eritrea and Isaias.

Abiy’s relative peace with the Tigrayan elite, which has an axe to grind against Isaias, is perceived as a threat to Asmara. Tigrayan officials accused Eritrea of being involved in the illegal smuggling of Tigray’s gold. Eritrea’s Minister of Information, Yemane G. Meskel, dismissed the accusation on X emphasizing “the people of our region have no appetite for costly wars stoked by incorrigible conflict entrepreneurs”.

Ankara’s mediation effort also breaks the momentum of Eritrea’s recent tripartite alliance involving Egypt and Somalia. On December 26, President Hasan Shiekh and President Isaias met in Asmara and reiterated the tripartite agreement with Egypt, underlying the need to secure and guarantee Somalia’s stability by “extricating external interventions” in the region.

As the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are likely to escalate, the Ankara Declaration stands as a testament to Türkiye’s engagement in the Horn of Africa.

Türkiye’s strategic depth in the Horn 

Successfully mediating the Ankara Declaration, President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an has positioned Türkiye as a key power broker in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye’s relatively balanced relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia gave it the gravitas and leverage to mediate the talks. The Ethiopia-Somalia deal showcases Türkiye’s pragmatic foreign policy approach in Africa under President Erdogan.

Since 2011, Türkiye has increased its footprint in the region most notably in Somalia by providing humanitarian aid, investing in infrastructure, and signing commercial and military cooperation agreements including opening the largest military base in Mogadishu, developing Hobyo port, enhancing Somalia’s maritime security capabilities and in exploration for oil and gas. Türkiye has also forged strong economic and military ties with Ethiopia – its supply of TB2 drones was instrumental in turning the tide for Abiy during the Tigray war.

Türkiye’s increasing influence and strategic depth in the Horn will inevitably draw attention from regional competitors, including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Egypt might consider it as an obstacle to its recent military presence in Somalia as the mediation cuts it out of the loop. The UAE, a key ally of Abiy and reportedly silent sponsor of the MoU with Somaliland, is likely to perceive Türkiye’s growing role with suspicion as a challenge to its own strategic interests in the Horn. Türkiye’s mediation could also position it as a possible mediator in Sudan where Egypt and UAE are reportedly involved in backing the embattled generals of the Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces respectively.

US recognition of Somaliland’s statehood

With the post of US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa vacant and its attention divided between Ukraine, Gaza and Syria, the outgoing Biden administration resorted to backdoor pressure and left Erdogan to work out a deal.

The US’s recent ambiguous stance on Somaliland may pose a challenge to the implementation of the Ankara Declaration. While Washington officially does not recognize Somaliland, reports of potential plans on recognition under the incoming Trump Administration have added uncertainty to the regional dynamics. While talks in Ankara were taking place, Scott Perry, Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced a bill to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign, independent country.

US recognition of Somaliland would drastically alter the regional configuration, changing the calculus of Ethiopia and Somalia.

In conclusion, the Ankara Declaration is a positive development to deescalate the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, but its success hinges on resolving deeper regional challenges. Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions remain uncertain given continuing tensions with Eritrea. Türkiye has reasserted its influence in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s plans on Somaliland’s recognition further complicate regional dynamics.