Whether seen as a diplomatic masterstroke or a bold public relations move, the meeting between the Congolese and Rwandan presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, under the auspices of Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani on 18 March in Doha, has highlighted Qatar’s growing role on the African stage.

It took some time for the effects of this diplomacy to be truly felt on the ground, but on 23 April a new step marked a significant change: a commitment to “work towards a ceasefire” co-signed by the M23/Congo River Alliance and the Congolese authorities, who had previously considered any discussions with the rebels a “red line”.

On 25 April, the meeting in Washington between the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, resulted in a commitment by both parties to draft “a preliminary peace agreement”. The discussions, which have just started, will span several weeks to have Tshisekedi and Kagame sign a formal peace agreement.

Doha remains the venue for most of the discussions concerning eastern DRC, with the Qatari capital hosting Congolese and Rwandan authorities, M23 representatives and even religious leaders. This diplomatic activism is the latest – and most spectacular – manifestation of the ever-growing influence of the Wahhabi monarchy on the continent.

 

 

Negotiations between Déby Itno and rebel factions

After a period of relative forced isolation during the diplomatic crisis between Qatar and its Saudi and Emirati neighbours from 2017 to 2021, Doha has launched an offensive across Africa, relying notably on its robust network of embassies present in half of the continent’s countries.

The eastern DRC issue is not the only one, and far from the first, in which Qatar’s emir has been involved. Doha has also intervened in the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, which began with the incursion of Eritrean troops into Ras Doumeira in 2008. Ironically, it was after the withdrawal of Qatari troops from the buffer zone in 2017 that Presidents Ismail Omar Guelleh (Djibouti) and Isaias Afwerki (Eritrea) reached an agreement, under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.

Another sensitive conflict in which Qatar has been involved is the negotiations between Chad’s Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, head of the Transitional Military Council, and about 40 rebel factions. An agreement was reached in August 2022, signed in Doha after five months of negotiations.

 

Al Jazeera and Qatar Charity as soft power tools

While Doha is directly involved in diplomatic affairs, Qatar relies on other powerful levers to cement its influence on the continent. In 2012 and 2022, Qatari investments in Africa amounted to $7.2bn, according to an Afreximbank study. The Al Jazeera news channel is one of the most formidable soft power tools, as it is widely followed by public opinion in many sub-Saharan countries.

Another vehicle for Doha is Qatar Charity. Straddling humanitarian and religious domains, this supposedly non-governmental organisation, highly active on the continent, is led by Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, a member of the royal family who has served as a minister multiple times. Its board of directors also includes royal family members.

 

Massive investments in aviation

Perhaps the most strategic sector for Doha is aviation, as it seeks to transcend the role of a mere air hub in the Middle East. From Côte d’Ivoire to Morocco, via Rwanda, Qatar Airways operates numerous routes across the continent. The national airline also invests in infrastructure, such as at Kigali International Airport, where Qatar Airways is the majority shareholder.

The airline has also announced its intention to take stakes in the Rwandan national carrier, RwandAir. Last August, Qatar Airways made a new move in African skies by taking a 25% stake in South African airline Airlink, which serves over 45 destinations across 15 African countries.

With its strong presence in African skies, Qatar is also expanding its network on the ground, driven by a quest for arable land to ensure its food “autonomy”, notably through the Global Dryland Alliance. Doha has also acquired more than 100,000 hectares of arable land in Sudan to grow wheat and rice, and it is purchasing land in South Africa and Morocco.