Yet, despite Washington’s renewed focus on securing critical minerals via the Lobito route, Beijing is extending its infrastructure dominance, leaving the US to play catch-up.

On July 20, Huatong Angola, the local subsidiary of China’s Huatong Group, signed a US$900 million deal with state-owned Barra do Dande Development Society, S.A. (SDBD) to develop new port facilities in Barra do Dande, about 600km (373 miles) north of the Lobito port.

The port is part of the Barra do Dande Integrated Development Free Zone, an export-led venture designed to provide both a manufacturing, export and logistics hub just north of the capital, Luanda. This will be done by transforming remote terrain on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean.

It is the kind of heavy engineering project that Chinese companies execute frequently across Africa at low cost, a feat their Western counterparts cannot match.

Chinese companies have used this factor to their advantage on the continent, and there is unlikely to be any US response to this latest project in Angola, according to Eric Olander, an analyst and editor at the China Global South Project, a US-based research non-profit.

“The US doesn’t have the kind of construction companies that can operate at the lower end of the cost structure the way that Chinese firms have been so successful over the years,” Olander said. “The [US] administration’s Africa policy is largely focused on security and securing access to raw materials; that’s it.”

How China is reshaping its economic ties with Africa

The investment protocols signed by Huatong Angola, its financial partner, Berkshire Waterhouse Infrastructure, and the SDBD – representing the host government – comprise two agreements.

The first covers the 25-year concession of the port terminal costing US$450 million, while the second, also for the same amount, covers the provision of port infrastructure.

The first phase of construction is scheduled to be completed in two years and will feature a completed terminal that can enable exports from the free-trade zone.

Two more phases will be completed by 2030, leaving a port that can handle 80,000-tonne vessels, employ 21,000 people and generate US$10 billion annually, according to Roque Saraiva, president of the SDBD’s board of directors.

“The investment is provided entirely by the private sector,” Saraiva said, stressing the project’s viability and investor confidence.

The concession to manage the ports will last for 25 years. It adds to China’s growing maritime footprint in Angola.

In 2022, two Chinese state-owned companies, Citic Construction and Shandong Port Group were the winners in an international public tender to run the container and general cargo terminals of Angola’s Lobito port for 20 years. The port is the terminus of the Lobito Railway in which the US invested.

Then in January, China Energy Engineering Corporation completed a major revamp of the Cabinda port, further north of Barra do Dande. The aim was to enable the port to receive container ships and other large roll-on-roll-off vessels meant for Angola and neighbouring countries.

Biden’s 2024 trip was partly to mend fences given that the US had opposed the Angolan ruling party’s rise to power and for decades after the country became independent, backed a rebel movement that sought to topple the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government.

Diplomatic relations were established in 1993, almost 20 years after Angola’s independence.

The Biden administration framed the Angolan investment as part of efforts to move the US towards an energy transition. For this, critical minerals were needed for battery technology and EVs.

“While the deal builds on groundwork laid under the Biden administration, its significance has sharpened under President Donald Trump,” said Alex Vines, director of the Africa Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“It reflects a move away from climate-focused diplomacy towards a harder geoeconomic approach centred on critical mineral supply chains, regional trade integration and great power competition.”

Among officials in Washington, there was even talk of winning Angola over from China to the side of the US. But the consideration seemed to ignore the depth of relations Beijing had developed with Luanda, observers noted.

Though China briefly backed the MPLA before switching to a rival group during Angola’s liberation war against Portugal, it repaired relations after the ruling party came to power and established diplomatic relations by 1983.

Both nations forged closer relations under former president Eduardo dos Santos and China financed major infrastructure projects, some in exchange for Angola’s oil.

The close relations continued under President Joao Lourenco, who succeeded dos Santos in 2017. During a 2024 visit to China, Lourenco steered the conversation with China towards mining, agriculture and projects that would help to build an industrial base and diversify the country away from oil dependence.

The two countries also upgraded their relations to “a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” – one of the highest levels.

In contrast to China, the US had restricted its African interests to security and getting access to critical supplies, Olander of the China Global South Project said.

“Sure, they don’t like the Chinese and would prefer they not succeed in a place like Angola, but they’re not going to do anything to respond to this announcement.”