Courtesy of Foreign Policy, an article on the petroleum politics between Sudan and South Sudan.  As the report notes:

Although today’s African Union (AU)-U.N. deadline for reconciliation between Sudan and South Sudan has come and gone without a resolution, the Security Council is unlikely to follow through on its threatened targeted sanctions for now (China and Russia are unlikely to endorse them).  While an oil deal in the next few weeks remains unlikely, the economic and patronage imperatives in both capitals finally point toward an interim oil deal before the end of the year or in early 2013 — despite plenty of spoilers on both sides who see compromise as capitulation. Each side has made an initial offer on transit fees, and while more movement is needed, resumption of most of Sudan’s 350,000 barrels per day (BPD) will likely occur by the end of the year or, at the latest, in early 2013.

Ever since South Sudan shut down its northern-bound oil production in January, the two nations have been engaged in a battle of economic attrition, punctuated with actual and proxy battles near their disputed border. South Sudan, which depends on oil for more than 95 percent of its revenue base, injected a ray of hope in recent weeks into the long-languishing talks, with an offer of over $8 billion in debt relief and compensation for Khartoum, and pipeline fees of about $8 per barrel of oil. The government of Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum wasted no time in rejecting the offer, insisting that border security is the top priority — but its revised (albeit still low) offer of roughly $32 per barrel a few days later indicates that the two countries are slowly moving toward a deal. Sweeteners from China and the Gulf states will probably be necessary to get Khartoum to raise its offer further. Despite the initial rejection, the new terms should provide the basis for a reasonable oil deal that could get Sudanese crude flowing again. Though full production will take several months, the largely unexpected addition of more than 200,000 BPD of Sudanese crude would be a small, but not insignificant, supply bump for highly volatile oil markets.

The embattled Bashir administration cannot afford to appear weak, and declined a meeting with South Sudan President Salva Kiir ahead of the U.N. deadline this week. But it literally cannot afford the drastic austerity that looms on account of lost oil revenues, which explains Khartoum’s acceptance to attend an AU summit with Kiir in the near future. The envisioned Sudanese cutbacks make Greek austerity look like a walk in the park — not to mention the additional pain of high inflation, a sharp depreciation of the Sudanese pound, and an incipient anti-regime protest movement. The Kiir administration faces an equally negative outlook, with inflation well above 70 percent and a 56 percent-unfunded budget despite a nearly 40 percent cut in spending. Dwindling donor patience will serve to push Juba’s hand toward a deal. Even more significant is Juba’s belated realization that a southern-based pipeline, if it emerges at all, is years away and therefore not a panacea for its pressing needs.

A binding deal on oil revenue sharing will not be possible or sustainable if the Sudans remain in a shooting war on both sides of the border. Both of the military-dominated governments would plough a huge percentage of oil revenues into security, risking an even greater escalation, making both sides understandably wary of an oil deal without security guarantees-particularly Khartoum, which faces multiple insurgencies just a year after its painful loss of the south.

Talks have broken down several times over the location of a demilitarized zone, which would represent the first step to ending hostilities. During her visit to Juba this week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will pressure the Kiir administration to follow through on security guarantees in order to move negotiations forward. Juba’s implicit bargain now appears to be to demobilize its affiliated militias in Southern Kordofan and elsewhere, in exchange for an independence referendum in Abyei, which would likely see the district join South Sudan. Khartoum will no doubt exact a higher price, through higher transit fees. Hammering out such a deal will be tough, but the reality of a mutually destructive stalemate, together with both Juba and Khartoum’s revised oil offers, should offer scope for a deal-albeit a shaky one-sooner than most would expect.