Via the Clingendael Institute’s China Center, commentary on China’s Digital Silk Road:

Since the introduction of the Digital Silk Road as part of the BRI in 2015, China’s presence internationally has taken a digital turn. Beijing aspires to set global standards for technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things. These efforts as part of the Digital Silk Road contribute to compatibility between Chinese and overseas technological networks, benefiting China’s market position. However, today, news and research on the Digital Silk Road is fueled with concern.

In Latin America, asymmetry in trade with China leads to a trajectory of growing economic dependence on China. The asymmetry in trade is seen in the type of export between China and Latin America. Between 2015 and 2019 almost 70% of Latin American exports were composed of commodities: soybeans and other oilseeds, crude oil, copper ores and concentrates, iron ores and concentrates, and refined copper. On the other hand, China mainly exports manufactured goods that are technology-intensive. Among Latin Americans, the fear of a ‘centre-periphery’ dynamic that the continent has experienced before is rising.

In the Middle East and North Africa, Chinese technology firms have a high presence. Technology companies like Huawei, Alibaba and Baidu are investing heavily in regional commerce and telecommunications. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, digital connectivity has become more prominent in the MENA region, making the Chinese companies even more important in the post-pandemic era. The explanation for the quick rise of Chinese tech giants in the MENA region lies partly in the affordability. Where inequality in internet access has been a critical challenge across the region, phone brands like Vivo, Oppo and Xiaomi, in combination with 5G technology offered by Chinese brands, are increasingly popular for consumers.

Following the workers strike outside the NagaWorld casino in Phnom Penh last winter, also in Cambodia concern over Chinese technology has grown. Drones buzzing over the crowd of protesters and surveillance through cameras characterized the strike as well as the months that followed. Much of the technology used in Phnom Penh is supplied by China as part of their BRI infrastructure project. Steven Feldstein, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, says that “in authoritarian settings, these capabilities have obvious potential to deepen repression”. On top of that, it cannot be excluded that the Chinese state may be able to amass data and benefit from it.

The latest CNAS report on competitive connectivity recommends the transatlantic partners to protect critical infrastructure on the basis of national security considerations. For example, according to the report the European Union should prevent the purchase of 5G hardware or services from companies lacking a transparent ownership structure. This leads to the following question: are countries in Latin America, MENA or South Asia in the position to follow a similar course of action?