The recent decision by the BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — to expand the group’s membership made splashy headlines. But now it is time to assess what this move means for geopolitics and U.S. foreign policy.

In a nutshell, BRICS expansion is a win for China and will increase Beijing’s geopolitical clout. China is the most influential player in the institution, which will have more diplomatic heft post-expansion. But it is a win with limits — the BRICS will remain an unwieldy organization in which meaningful decisions are hard to come by. For that reason, expansion does not significantly increase the Chinese geopolitical challenge to the U.S.. 

What it does suggest is that Washington must look beyond its China policy and more fully recognize the reality of a rising Global South in its dealings with all multilateral institutions, including the BRICS, the G20, and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, where high-level debate will begin on September 19), and other bodies.

China sees itself as the leader of the Global South and seeks to co-opt the BRICS — as the most influential voice of the Global South — into its sphere of influence.

At their summit in Johannesburg two weeks ago, the BRICS countries extended formal invitations to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and Argentina to join in January 2024. China pushed hard for immediate expansion, while India and Brazil pushed back. They eventually backed down, not wanting to be seen as spoilers and create ill will with the countries who wanted entry. There is a maxim that “a middle power can’t offend another middle power,” and that played a role here.

China sees itself as the leader of the Global South and seeks to co-opt the BRICS — as the most influential voice of the Global South — into its sphere of influence. In particular, Beijing wants to tap into developing countries’ grievances regarding current international institutions and global governance. Expansion will also give China a larger group of countries in which to socialize its values and policies. Most of the new invitees will be open to hearing China’s message; with the possible exception of Argentina, all of them have moved closer to China over the past decade in the economic sphere, the political arena, or both.

It is also important to see this Chinese win in the context of its broader geopolitical strategy. China seeks to build global influence via sway in a latticework of international institutions, including the UN and the WTO. Beijing’s goals range from broad diplomatic influence to narrow influence over economic standards. The BRICS fit into that framework. More broadly, China is pushing three intertwined initiatives — the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. They are essentially China-focused ideas for global governance and are part of China’s effort to push back against perceived containment. China views an expanded BRICS as a vehicle to push these initiatives.

Expansion also has important implications for the landscape of multilateral institutions. The BRICS’ increased geopolitical heft will make it the most influential anti-Western institution. Its closest competitor, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is still a regional organization focused primarily on Central Asia. The Russia/China/Iran partnership is of course a much greater threat to the West but is not an institution.

We will likely see a new dynamic now where the G7 and the BRICS joust to control the narrative. A functioning G20 could be a bridge, but that organization is paralyzed by the absence of a shared commitment to provide public goods. The jousting may not change much on the ground, but it will increase polarization in geopolitics.

However, that is the end of the good news for Beijing. A real win, but one that comes with major qualifications.

India is the second most influential member of the BRICS and will oppose most initiatives that strengthen Chinese influence over the organization. That is very important in an organization that operates on consensus decision-making.

Equally important, the “energy” remains at the state level. The key states in the Global South have more agency than at any time since the Cold War, and act in their national interest much more than on an ideological basis. The dominant orientation in the Global South is not to align more with the U.S. or China, but rather to strongly oppose aligning with either side. That is clearly the case with Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, who want to avoid choosing sides and will seek instead to play the great powers off against each other. They are classic swing states. Beijing will be dealing with a group that will listen to its arguments, but that will make decisions much more on national interest than on loyalty to the BRICS or to China.

Critically, there is a chance that neither Saudi Arabia nor Argentina will join — at least not on time. The Saudi decision is very important geopolitically, as the BRICS gain much more heft if Riyadh and its deep financial pockets are part of the expansion. Riyadh wanted an invitation, but their decision will be entwined with the ongoing talks with Washington over recognition of Israel in exchange for U.S. security guarantees and provision of a civilian nuclear program. Riyadh is using BRICS membership as leverage over the U.S. administration; it’s a tossup on whether Saudi will ultimately join.

Argentina, however, is more likely to stay out. Both leading opposition candidates in October’s presidential election, Javier Milei and Patricia Bulrich, have stated that if they win, they won’t support the country entering the BRICS given its pro-China stance. Given the very low odds of the government-backed candidate (Sergio Massa) winning, Argentina’s proposed entry is likely to be a flash in the pan. 

It is also noteworthy that all current members and invitees, outside of Russia, China, and Iran, have important security relationships with the U.S.. That further circumscribes how far any of these other eight states will move towards Beijing. Finally, Indonesia’s decision not to apply for membership shows the sensitivity of that step for the swing states. President Joko Widodo was concerned that the BRICS has increasingly become an anti-Western bloc — or at least a polarizing entity. He seeks greater security and economic ties with the West and did not want membership to inhibit that.

IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The first implication of all this is that BRICS expansion is not a big setback for the U.S.. There is concern in Washington that Beijing successfully led the push for near-term expansion, over the objection of states with whom the U.S. has close ties. But as this analysis has shown, the victory for China was qualified and adds only marginally to the geopolitical challenge that it poses to U.S. interests.

A second implication is that Washington must look beyond its rivalry with China and recognize a profound trend — the Global South is rising, and most of its key states are swing states. Countries in the Global South are focused on obtaining greater sway over international institutions and governance. They generally oppose current structures which they view as reflecting an era of American dominance during the post-World War II era. This trend and message will regularly face U.S. foreign policy not only via the BRICS, but also in the G20 and at UNGA. 

…Washington must look beyond its rivalry with China and recognize a profound trend — the Global South is rising, and most of its key states are swing states.

At the G20 last weekend in New Delhi, the Global South was very effective at influencing the agenda. India, South Africa, and Brazil brokered a deal on language regarding the war in Ukraine in the final declaration. Without that language, the summit would probably not have produced a declaration, and India’s prestige and emerging leadership role in the Global South would have taken a hit. India and its partners also led a successful drive to make the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a permanent member of the G20 — the OAU will help push forward a common agenda.

Finally the declaration contained language supportive of multilateral development bank reform and climate goals in the Global South. The growing global consensus for change on these issues will lead to at least moderately increased financial flows to developing countries. At UNGA, the entire Global South will be present and will push forward a similar agenda. BRICS leaders want their finance ministers to report back in less than a year with measures to decrease dollar dependency.

Any new non-Western grouping that seeks to reduce the role of the dollar should be taken seriously in Washington as a potential long-term threat but viewed skeptically over the medium-term. Despite previous efforts to displace it, the dollar is the undisputed king of currencies for settling international trade. The Bank for International Settlements’ triennial survey of foreign exchange showed that the dollar was on one side of 88 percent of all foreign exchange trades in April 2022, a figure unchanged since 2019. A Fed study on the international role of the dollar found that the dollar’s role in international reserves and transactions is basically unchanged over the five years from 2018 to 2023.