Given the quality of the country’s resources, it is unsurprising that the DRC attracted more exploration investment in 2024—$130.7 million—than any other African nation.

The History of U.S. and Chinese Engagement in the DRC Mining Industry

Historically, the United States has not invested adequate diplomatic or financial resources into strengthening its relationship with the DRC, especially regarding mineral resources. A U.S. government official remarked to the author that gathering support from the U.S. government to promote U.S. interests in the DRC has been an experience akin to “shaking pennies from cushions.” Currently, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) does not offer coverage for the DRC, and the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has focused primarily on the Lobito Corridor, which has faced some challenges (discussed below). Support from the U.S. government to the DRC has largely centered on traditional overseas development assistance (ODA) aimed at education, health, and other socioeconomic goals rather than on commercial diplomacy. Although these efforts are important, they have not substantially advanced trade, investment, or mineral security objectives.

Meanwhile, China has established a significant advantage in the DRC over the last two decades. The Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines) agreement, signed in 2007, was a resource-for-infrastructure agreement that allowed Chinese companies to access cobalt, copper, and other minerals in return for investments in infrastructure.³ Under the agreement, Chinese firms committed $3 billion to infrastructure projects in exchange for mining rights to deposits near the city of Kolwezi in southeastern DRC, valued at approximately $93 billion.⁴

The absence of U.S. government involvement in commercial matters has enabled China to further cement its dominance in one of the most resource-rich nations in the world. In 2016, the American company Freeport-McMoRan sold one of the world’s most valuable copper and cobalt mines, Tenke Fungurume (TFM), to China Molybdenum Company (CMOC). It is the largest cobalt mine in the world, containing 3.3 million tons of cobalt—substantially more than the second-largest cobalt mine, Kisanfu, which has 1.9 million tons. TFM also ranks as the seventh-largest operating copper mine globally, with an estimated 30.6 million tons of the mineral.⁵

The absence of U.S. government involvement in commercial matters has enabled China to further cement its dominance in one of the most resource-rich nations in the world.

The transaction was facilitated by significant financial support from Chinese state-backed entities. Before the sale, Freeport-McMoRan held a 56 percent stake in TFM and managed the mine, while Canadian company Lundin Mining owned a minority share of 24 percent.⁶ However, Freeport-McMoRan was heavily in debt due to two ill-timed acquisitions in the oil and gas sector just before the oil price collapse in 2014.⁷ In May 2016, the company announced it would sell its interest in TFM for $2.65 billion to alleviate its financial burdens.⁸ After Lundin declined its right of first refusal, Freeport-McMoRan sold its stake to CMOC, whose purchase was assisted by $1.59 billion from six Chinese banks, including state-owned institutions such as the Bank of China, China Development Bank, and China CITIC Bank.⁹ CMOC then sought a partner to acquire Lundin’s share in TFM. BHR, a Hong Kong–based firm, purchased all of Lundin’s equity for $1.14 billion, with $700 million in funding coming from Chinese state-owned banks.¹⁰ Before finalizing the deal with BHR, an agreement was made for CMOC to acquire BHR’s stake, resulting in CMOC holding an 80 percent ownership of one of the world’s premier copper and cobalt mines (Gécamines, the DRC’s state-owned mining entity, retained its 20 percent minority stake).¹¹ Cumulatively, Chinese state-owned banks provided $2.48 billion of the $2.68 billion in credit (in constant 2021 prices) issued for the TFM acquisition.¹²

The change in ownership had social consequences. Under Freeport-McMoRan’s ownership, TFM established a model that balanced corporate and community interests. This included investing over $215 million to renovate a hydroelectric power station and refurbish four turbines, sourcing more than 98 percent of its workforce from local communities, and demonstrating flexibility toward increased government ownership.¹³ Recent interviews by the author with DRC government officials and former TFM employees in both Kinshasa, the nation’s capital, and Kolwezi, where the mine is located, suggest that labor conditions and the quality of surrounding infrastructure have declined significantly since the change in ownership.

Not intervening in CMOC’s acquisition of TFM is arguably the most significant commercial misstep the United States has made in Africa. Consequently, China now owns or holds stakes in 15 of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the DRC. Without proactive measures, history may repeat itself. Glencore, the largest Western investor in the DRC, has had initial discussions about selling its multibillion-dollar copper and cobalt mines. Glencore owns the Mutanda mine and holds a 75 percent stake in the Kamoto copper mine. Together, these operations are valued at $6.8 billion.¹⁴

China now owns or holds stakes in 15 of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the DRC.

Resetting the United States’ Focus on Congolese Mining

There is now a unique window of opportunity to build U.S.-DRC minerals cooperation, for two emerging reasons. First, the intensifying conflict between Rwanda and the DRC has prompted DRC President Felix Tshisekedi to offer the United States access to the nation’s mineral resources in exchange for military assistance. The M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, have captured substantial areas of mineral-rich land along the DRC’s eastern border and recently took control of Goma, a major regional city with over 2 million inhabitants, after more than 30 years of conflict.¹⁵ The M23 is now threatening to advance all the way to Kinshasa.¹⁶ President Tshisekedi has drawn parallels between the DRC-Rwanda conflict and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Secondly, there is increasing fatigue regarding China’s market manipulation. As China has flooded the global market with DRC-sourced cobalt, prices have decreased, resulting in reduced tax revenues on a per-ounce production basis. The rise in output from Chinese mines has led to a 51.8 percent year-on-year increase in cobalt exports from the DRC.¹⁷ Chinese firms, backed by the state, are willing to absorb these losses in exchange for long-term dominance in the global cobalt market. To address this issue, the DRC implemented a cobalt export ban in February 2025 for at least four months. The country’s fatigue toward Chinese market manipulation has been expressed by both government and private sector stakeholders.

Nevertheless, several significant challenges have impeded the DRC’s ability to attract Western investment, including ongoing conflict, a challenging business environment, strong Chinese market dominance, and insufficient infrastructure. This presents a crucial opportunity for the United States. To succeed, the United States must create a mutually beneficial framework for engagement. This will require legislative changes, deployment of strategic capital, and provision of technical assistance.

This brief address two questions: First, how can the U.S. government utilize its resources to maximize impact in this sector? And second, what reforms can the DRC government implement to attract investment? Drawing on an analysis of geological and economic data, interviews with government officials and private sector executives in both Washington and Kinshasa, and site visits to mines in Kolwezi in the DRC’s copper belt, these recommendations outline a comprehensive risk mitigation strategy for the DRC while examining how the United States can help attract catalytic private capital from the Western mining sector. Several major U.S. firms have already expressed interest in bringing operations to the DRC.¹⁸ Bilateral cooperation between the United States and the DRC will be crucial to countering China’s dominance in the Congolese minerals sector, which has been established through continuous engagement over the past two decades.

Recommendations for the U.S. Government

1. Reform Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The restrictions of Dodd-Frank’s Section 1502 have been the flagship U.S. engagement with the Congolese mining industry. Section 1502 targets the DRC and mandates that publicly traded U.S. companies disclose whether their products contain conflict minerals—tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold (known together as 3TG)—sourced from the DRC or neighboring countries. It was implemented to address concerns that the trade of these minerals was funding armed groups and contributing to violence in the region. While intended to promote ethical sourcing, the legislation has been ineffective. Modeling shows that the prevalence of conflict in the DRC has roughly doubled since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.¹⁹ In a 2015 hearing entitled “Dodd-Frank Five Years Later: What Have We Learned from Conflict Minerals Reporting?,” Representative Bill Huizenga noted that: “Five years later, I am very concerned that this well-intentioned conflict minerals rule is actually harming the very people it was intended to help. In a November 2014 article, the Washington Post reported that the conflict minerals rule, while well-intentioned, ‘set off a chain of events that has propelled millions of Congolese miners and their families deeper into poverty,’ with many miners ‘forced to find other ways to survive, including by joining armed groups.’”²⁰

   There has been an increase in the smuggling of minerals out of the DRC. In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department said that over 90 percent of the DRC’s gold was being “smuggled to regional states, including Uganda and Rwanda.”²¹ In 2023, Rwanda’s mineral exports rose to over $1.1 billion, up from $772 million in 2022—a 42.5 percent increase.²² By July 2024, the U.S. State Department released a statement noting that: “The United States government is deeply concerned by the ongoing conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting humanitarian crisis.” The statement went on to note that, “In many cases, these minerals directly or indirectly benefit armed groups and move out of the country through Rwanda and to Uganda before moving to major refining and processing countries.”²³

   Adopting a traceability program with the originator of the minerals—the DRC— rather than a proxy—Rwanda—would be a vital step toward defunding conflict and bringing stability to the region. In February 2024, the European Union and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding to boost cooperation on sustainable raw materials value chains.²⁴ The European Union has agreed to give Rwanda roughly $935 million in exchange for access to resources. The DRC’s Tshisekedi has called the deal “an absolute scandal” and accused the European Union of being “complicit in the theft and looting of Congo.”²⁵

   Conflict minerals are a challenge globally—from polysilicon in Xinjiang, China, (mined with forced Uyghur labor) to cobalt from artisanal and small-scale mines in the DRC.²⁶ A global set of traceability requirements could address a systemic challenge within the industry and accelerate an end to conflict minerals. Expanding the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals could be one approach. This set of guidelines already includes 46 countries across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Latin America, Central Asia, and North Africa.²⁷
    

2. Provide technical assistance on geological mapping to encourage greenfield investment and strengthen the mineral diplomacy capabilities of the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa. Although Chinese companies currently dominate operational mines, there is considerable potential for greenfield investment to build a new mine, which would necessitate an expansion of geological mapping in the DRC. In 2024, an official from the Mining Cadaster Team at the DRC’s Ministry of Mines highlighted to the author that only 20 percent of the country had been mapped, and that existing data had not been updated in over 70 years. Currently, the DRC government is financing new mapping initiatives by Xcalibur Smart Mapping, a Spanish firm. The survey has already completed work in Katanga Province and has now shifted to Kasai, in central DRC. There was stated interest by the Ministry of Mines official in attracting a U.S. entity to support mapping. The last significant engagement between the United States and the DRC regarding geological mapping occurred in November 2023, but no further developments have taken place. Updating geological, geophysical, and geochemical data remains a top priority for the country and presents an opportunity for the United States to utilize its technical expertise to enhance bilateral cooperation. Aligned with global best practices, the DRC’s mining cadaster—which has a detailed record of mining rights and permits—is publicly available online.

   The United States should enhance the mineral diplomacy capabilities of its embassy in Kinshasa by adding a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) attaché and a Commercial Service Office. The USGS attaché can work alongside the DRC government to conduct geological surveys and formulate a resource strategy that supports Western investment. The Commercial Office can help mobilize private investments across the mining ecosystem—including in energy, logistics, mining, and manufacturing—while also advocating for essential business reforms and supporting negotiations and commercial dispute resolution in the DRC. A precedent for this exists, as the U.S. government successfully established its first Commercial Service Offices at embassies in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia in 2024.
    

3. Leverage financing resources through the DFC and EXIM. Both institutions have financed limited mining projects globally—but neither has financed them in the DRC. If the United States is serious about expanding its bilateral minerals diplomacy, aligning its financing mechanisms with its engagement strategy will be key. In particular, utilizing debt guarantees, risk insurance, and equity investments could be catalytic for mobilizing private capital.

Both the DFC and EXIM have financed limited mining projects globally—but neither has financed them in the DRC.

4. Prioritize investment in strategic infrastructure. Successfully developing the mining industry will require substantial infrastructure investment. The absence of energy infrastructure is a significant barrier to the development of greenfield mining projects in the DRC. Mining is one of the most energy-intensive industries worldwide, accounting for approximately 38 percent of industrial energy consumption and around 15 percent of global electricity usage.²⁸ The DRC has one of the world’s lowest rates of energy access, with only about 20 percent of its population projected to have access to energy by 2030. Globally, it has the third-largest population without access to electricity. Additionally, there is a significant disparity in energy access within the country—41 percent of urban residents have access to modern energy, compared to only 1 percent of the rural population.²⁹

   The World Bank and other multilateral organizations have spent decades investing in the development of the Grand Inga Dam, which is planned to be twice the size of the world’s largest hydroelectric facility, China’s Three Gorges Dam. In 2014, the World Bank approved a $73.1 million grant for the Inga Dam project, with additional cofinancing from the African Development Bank.³⁰ However, the World Bank withdrew from the project in 2016 due to “strategic differences” with the DRC government, after only 6 percent of the grant had been disbursed. In 2024, the World Bank announced that it was in talks to reengage in the initiative. Despite decades of efforts to construct the Inga Dam, progress has been minimal.³¹ Rather than pursuing one grand project, focusing on micro-centers—hubs of hydroelectric, wind, or geothermal power—can be more economically viable and come online quicker. To lower barriers for Western companies entering the DRC, the United States should increase funding for institutions like the DFC and Power Africa, which can finance and offer technical assistance for such energy infrastructure projects. Power Africa established an office in Kinshasa in 2023, but enhancing its funding could enable it to go beyond technical assistance to provide catalytic capital. Blended finance for infrastructure development—from governments, the private sector, and multilateral development banks—will be key to reducing the cost of building new mines in the DRC.

   Transportation infrastructure is also vital. The flagship U.S. engagement with the DRC has been the Lobito Corridor, a railway and transportation network that creates the fastest route for the export of critical minerals from the African copper belt to the United States and Europe. Yet the project is not without controversy. Some officials in Kinshasa feel that at a time when regional conflict is high and mineral smuggling rampant, connecting it with neighboring countries through G7-funded infrastructure could adversely impact the DRC’s sovereignty. This underscores the importance of addressing drivers of conflict, wherever feasible, to minimize disruptions to minerals trade and infrastructure development.

   An official from the DRC’s Ministry of Mines indicated that Chinese state-backed companies develop the complete infrastructure package necessary for mining operations, including roads and energy systems. Similar support for infrastructure development for the mining ecosystem will be crucial to ensure that the United States does not miss out on greenfield investment opportunities.
    

5. Utilize strategic partnerships among G20 allies to promote interests in the DRC. Advancing minerals interests in the DRC will necessitate substantial financial, physical, and human capital. Collaboration can facilitate progress: Saudi Arabia has already established a memorandum of understanding focused on mineral cooperation with the DRC, while several Canadian, Indian, and Australian mining companies are at various stages of project development.³² Additionally, in October 2023, the European Union and the DRC signed a strategic partnership aimed at sustainable raw materials, which intends to align production with responsible mining standards, among other goals.³³

   The United States and its allies can utilize United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to obtain strategic intelligence that enhances security. Established in 2007 as one of the 11 unified combatant commands within the U.S. Department of Defense, AFRICOM’s mission includes promoting U.S. national security interests in Africa, improving stability and security on the continent, and fostering collaboration with African nations on various military and security issues. Mining is a capital-intensive and long-term industry, with the cost of establishing a mine and processing plant ranging from $500 million to $1 billion, over an average global timeline of 18 years.³⁴ In the context of ongoing violent regional conflicts, providing strategic intelligence to support the DRC’s security and stabilization efforts can instill the necessary confidence for firms from G20 countries while aligning U.S. mineral and national security efforts.

In the context of ongoing violent regional conflicts, providing strategic intelligence to support the DRC’s security and stabilization efforts can instill the necessary confidence for firms from G20 countries while aligning U.S. mineral and national security efforts.