Via The Asia Times, a very interesting analysis of China’s strategic interest in capitalizing on the convenience that Afghanistan and Pakistan offer for the exploitation of energy resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and its resulting prioritization of the stability of Afghanistan.  As the article notes:

“… Afghanistan’s geographic location has made it a much coveted strategic pivot in the current Great Game…  These significantly higher stakes have led to Central Asia assuming military, geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic significance for two major blocs – one led by the United States (North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO) and the other by China (Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO) – vying for influence in the region with seemingly dissimilar interests.

….Afghanistan’s strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense geostrategic significance for the landlocked countries of Central Asia and its prosperity is inextricably linked to the security situation in Central and South Asia. Immense energy resources and strategic location on China’s western frontier have led to Central Asia being referred to as China’s dingwei (Lebensraum).

… Some Indian analysts are convinced that China is engaged in a “creeping encirclement” of their country [2]. They see Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran forming the right or western pincer of this move, Bangladesh and Myanmar making up the left or eastern pincer with Sri Lanka acting as the southern anchor and completing the encirclement.

 India’s recent overtures toward Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia and the development of close ties with these countries appear to be aimed at weakening China’s right pincer and denying Pakistan a secure western frontier. Afghanistan figures prominently, therefore, in Chinese and Indian foreign policies. In fact, the decision to establish the first-ever Indian military outpost on foreign soil at the Farkhor air base in Tajikistan, just two kilometers from the Tajik-Afghan border, could well be perceived as an attempt to reduce the impact of the Chinese encirclement.

 According to a Chinese military journal, India’s forays into Afghanistan and the Central Asian arena are “designed to achieve four objectives: contain Pakistan; enhance energy security; combat terrorism; and pin down China’s development” [3]. As in the past, Afghanistan has once again emerged as the “strategic knot” for the region’s security.

 Afghanistan’s significance for China is also due to the latter’s imperative of ensuring Pakistan’s security. Pakistan, which is China’s foremost ally in South Asia and has been instrumental in China’s emergence on the global scene, has been constrained by its lack of geographic depth. Often referred to as Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth, this has been touted as a major weakness in Pakistan’s military confrontation with India. Pakistan’s military considers that a friendly Afghanistan bestows additional strategic depth to the country – this was one of the factors that led to Pakistan supporting the emergence of a “friendly” Taliban regime in Kabul.

…China, like Czarist Russia, yearns for access to the Indian Ocean and the plan to build a major port in Gwadar on Pakistan’s Mekran coast is a step in this direction. This port would enable China to project its military presence in proximity of the strategic global petroleum shipping routes as well as the oil-rich Middle East. The economic feasibility of Gwadar as a shipping hub would be significantly enhanced were it to be linked to Central Asia and China by road and rail links. Once again, since all such transportation links between Gwadar and Central Asia have to traverse through Afghanistan, the focal importance of the latter cannot be understated. According to the US Energy Information Administration, “Afghanistan’s strategic location could make the country an important pipeline transit route.” [4] 

…While Afghanistan has no proven fuel deposits, it nevertheless offers the easiest transportation route for the exploitation of the energy resources of the CARs and is predicted to have substantial non-fuel mineral resources essential for China’s industrialization [9]. This geo-economic significance of Afghanistan for China should not be understated considering the latter’s serious interest in the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources and the growing Sino-Afghan trade which reached $317 million in 2005-06.

 China has also evinced an interest in a pipeline to the Arabian Sea, with a view to importing gas and oil by supertankers from Gwadar, but it should be noted that the Gwadar port project is still severely debilitated by the absence of links to access the hinterland from the port [10]. As another option, China is considering transporting its energy shipments from Central Asia and the Middle East via tanker to Gwadar and then by pipe or truck to western China through the Karakoram Highway (KKH) [11].

Pakistan as a trade and energy corridor
 The second option falls in line with what the Pakistani leadership has been harping on for the past few years – their vision of exploiting Pakistan’s geography as a Trade and Energy Corridor (TEC) for China and other neighboring countries including India.

 Just last month, Musharraf told a student audience at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, “Pakistan is very much in favor of a pipeline between the Gulf and China through Pakistan and I have been speaking with your leadership about this. I am very sure in the future – it will happen.” Musharraf further elaborated that he envisioned improved road linkages between the two countries as  well as a rail link, a fiber optic communications link and energy pipelines. He also suggested the possibility of extending the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline to China.

 Interestingly, on the same date that Musharraf made this speech, the Indian government announced the visit of its petroleum minister to Islamabad to negotiate the possible extension of the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline to India and renaming it as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.

…Notwithstanding China’s reticent and non-committal position on this specific proposal, it is continuing support and participation in the major infrastructure projects in Pakistan that could be construed to be components of the TEC. China’s commitment to the construction of Phase II of Gwadar port, the new international airport at Gwadar, the upgrading of the KKH and interest in investing in an oil refinery and storage facilities are examples that substantiate the Chinese interest [12].

…The Trade Corridor’s starting point is the existing Karakoram Highway. A decision to upgrade the 335 kilometer KKH was taken during Musharraf’s visit to China in February 2006. The envisaged upgrade would widen the KKH from 10 to 30 meters, make it suitable for long vehicles and allow it to remain functional the entire year. In parallel with the KKH upgrade, China is also involved in the construction of a new rail line linking Gwadar to the main Iran-Pakistan rail line and is working with Pakistan to expedite customs over the Sino-Pakistani highway with a view to creating a stronger regional trade system.

On the Chinese side, a new extension of the Xinjiang railway up to Kashgar (about 500 kilometers via the KKH from the Sino-Pakistani border) has been completed while Pakistan has reciprocated by building a dry port at Sust on the KKH, which was inaugurated by Musharraf on July 4, 2006 [13]. In another related development, Iran has offered Pakistan land access through its territory to Central Asia and Afghanistan for trade in return for similar access to China through the KKH [14].

A railway line along the KKH is also being considered as an integral part of the TEC project. This would be used not only for trade purposes but also to transport energy, in case a pipeline is not a viable option. This rail track will be linked to Gwadar, where oil-refining and storage facilities are planned to be constructed by the Chinese. Pakistan has shortlisted a Chinese and a European firm to conduct the feasibility study for this 1,000 kilometer rail-track.

In Pakistan, the 750 kilometer track starts from Havelian and passes through the Karakoram mountains up to the Pak-China border at Khunjerab with the second part, consisting of a 250 kilometer track being constructed inside the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Experts estimate that this project could take 10 years to complete and cost around $5 billion [15].

While the envisaged Trade Corridor comprising of road and rail links could also be utilized for the transportation of oil and gas, a more efficient means of transporting these commodities would be through pipelines. These would make up the Energy Corridor component of the TEC. In an address in Islamabad on May 23, 2006, former Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said, “Pakistan and China are considering a feasibility study for an oil pipeline from Gwadar port to western China to transport China’s oil imports from the Gulf. An oil pipeline from Gwadar to western China would greatly reduce the time and distance for oil transport from the Gulf to China. A major oil refinery at Gwadar would further facilitate China’s oil imports.”

 The Pakistani government presented a blueprint of the 3,300 kilometer Karakoram oil pipeline during the first meeting of the Sino-Pak Energy Forum held at Islamabad from April 25-27, 2006. This proposal entails the construction of a 30-inch diameter pipeline from Gwadar till the Khunjerab Pass capable of handling 12 million tons of oil per year with an estimated construction cost of between $4.5 and 5 billion [16].

China has also recently shown interest in reviving the dormant UNOCAL pipeline project to pump natural gas from Turkmenistan to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan. This could also then be extended to China just like the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. Additionally, China’s Exim Bank is financing an oil pipeline from Port Qasim in Pakistan’s south to the country’s north. This pipeline would cater for 75% of Pakistan’s future oil needs and it has been under construction by China’s Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company since June 2006…”