Africa, with 60% of the arable land on the planet, 30% of the mineral reserves and a population approaching 1.5 billion, is an increasingly vital region for global security. Unfortunately, the US has not been adapting to a rapidly changing scene. In the latest blow, US troops have been forced to leave Niger, where the Pentagon had enjoyed a longstanding security partnership.

At the same time, Russia and China are consolidating political and military influence across the continent. Russian paramilitaries and mercenaries, using the model of the now-defunct Wagner Group, have been operating in Mali, Congo, the Central African Republic and other states. Autocratic leaders are hoping for economic benefits from Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative — and to purchase AI-enhanced versions of the equipment that has made China a surveillance state.

US Africa Command, charged with military-to-military cooperation throughout the region, warns that China is active in all the continent’s 54 countries. General Mike Langley, its commander, says that Beijing aspires to establish naval bases on the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and the Gulf of Aden. It has already built its first official overseas base on the Horn of Africa in Djibouti.

So, what are the basic tenets of a sensible strategic plan for this vast continent?

First, understand the immense diversity of Africa. The linguistic, historical and cultural differences are huge. Compare Ethiopia’s culture of longtime independence with South Africa’s tortuous colonial and apartheid experiences. Francophone Africa is very different than the handful of former Portuguese colonies. And all these countries had long pre-colonial historical experiences that shaped their national characters.

For example, during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the US became paralyzed and failed to react when Hutu militias killed roughly 800,000 Tutsis. We didn’t appreciate the simmering tensions between ethnic groups following Belgium’s colonial administration and were unprepared to intervene in the enormous human tragedy.

Second, concentrate efforts on several “anchor” countries in four distinct geographic areas. These are nations that have both regional and, in some cases, continent-wide influence. Incentives for them could include funding for key infrastructure through the US International Development Financing Corporation to compete with Belt and Road; military sales with preferential treatment for advanced systems such as fourth-generation fighter jets; military-to-military training, especially for special forces and counterterrorism; and more intelligence sharing.

Kenya, recently selected as a Major Non-NATO Ally, is the natural anchor in eastern Africa. Its president, William Ruto, was just hosted for a state visit in Washington — partly in recognition of his nation’s willingness to take on a complex security mission to Haiti that will benefit the US greatly.

Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent and boasting vast natural resources and Atlantic Ocean coastline, will be the key player in West Africa. Washington has had good military-to-military connectivity, but Nigeria could use more support fighting the Boko Haram terrorist group.

South Africa is also an obvious choice, despite the messy aftermath of last month’s election. The US ambassador, Reuben Brigety, recently told me, “It is in America’s interest of the US that South Africa succeed as a democracy that can deliver for its people.” South Africa is a continental leader and has an outsized voice in the Global South; it is the only African nation in the G-20; more than 600 American companies operate there, generating revenue roughly equal to 10% of South Africa’s GDP.

Ethiopia, with the continent’s second-largest population, is a natural partner in the north. But after a long period of stability, it has recently been wracked by civil war. The US deserves credit for being its top source of humanitarian aid, but we need to increase our diplomatic engagement. Given the flow of refugees from Sudan and Ethiopia’s desire to borrow $7 billion from IMF and World Bank, now is the time to be economically supportive.

Third comes improving ties with influential regional and global organizations. The most important of these is the African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Yet the US ambassador position has been vacant for more than a year. The State Department should appoint a foreign service officer with immense Africa experience to give the US continent-wide credibility.

Fourth, Washington should coordinate more closely with its global allies. A good example is France, which has retained strong connections with some of its former colonies. While France has also been suffering with withdrawals and expulsions of troops from some of these states (notably Niger and Mali), it retains strong business and military connections in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Chad. Putting joint US-French missions together for military training or economic development projects makes sense.

Fifth is providing more security support. This means military-to-military training and equipment through Africa Command. This has been done on a piecemeal basis, but Africa is not a one-size-fits-all challenge. A more nuanced approach, for example, might be to send ground trainers from not just the Army and Marine Corps, but also from the US reserves and National Guard, who can perhaps relate better to the smaller militaries on the continent.

As for naval support, the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, a massive Expeditionary Support Base — with heavy-lift helicopters, vast cargo capability and teams for special-forces training — began a deployment off West Africa in February. That’s good, but such initiatives should be constant, not sporadic. The US Coast Guard has conducted training in counterpiracy and drug interdiction with small coastal navies of West Africa, but this too needs to be on a more permanent footing.

Finally, Washington must compete with Beijing’s Belt and Road. China’s initiative has a mixed track record at best. While more than 40 out of 54 African nations are registered as part of BRI, some of the construction projects have turned out to be shoddy, and many loans have been canceled.

The US has institutions such as the Development Finance Corporation, which funds projects from a relatively small $1 billion budget, often working with the private sector and US Agency for International Development. For example, the DFC is now helping finance construction of part of the Lobito Corridor, a rail and road project traversing sub-Saharan Africa. Both the DFC and USAID are a fiscally smart way to engage in Africa, but they are hugely underfunded.

There is no overstating the strategic importance of Africa: By 2050, one in four people on the planet will live there. America’s great-power competitors have made deep inroads, and without a coherent strategy, the US will continue to lose influence and geopolitical advantage.