The US and China spend billions of dollars annually on development finance initiatives in Africa. The continent is consistently the largest recipient of loans, humanitarian assistance and other financing from the two major powers, making this another vector in the escalating Sino-US rivalry.

Last year, for example, the US spent $6.6bn on humanitarian assistance programmes that serve as a key part of Washington’s larger development finance strategy on the continent. This amount does not include the billions spent by the US Development Finance Corporation to upgrade railway lines in Angola or the dozens of other projects that DFC underwrites across Africa.

Similarly, after a near-decade-long decline, Chinese lending to African countries rebounded in 2023 to $4.62bn, according to Boston University’s Global Development Policy Centre. Although 2024 data about Chinese lending in Africa is still unavailable, most experts agree it will likely remain around that same level.

However, there are important distinctions in how the US and China leverage development finance to bolster their broader foreign policy objectives in Africa. Wang Miao, an assistant professor at Harbin Institute of Technology, outlined in a research report published last year in the Chinese Journal of African Studies the stark differences between Washington and Beijing’s approach to development finance in Africa.

Miao’s paper is by no means balanced in its assessment of the US and Chinese approaches to development finance across Africa. She presents her case in distinctly partisan terms, framing the US strategy as part of an effort to maintain hegemonic supremacy, which by extension includes the containment of Chinese influence in the region while portraying China as a benevolent power that strives for so-called “win-win” outcomes with local partners.

“China adopts a development-oriented strategy, while the US pays more attention to political and ideological factors,” Miao states in the introduction, clearly setting the ideological tone of the paper. “This structural difference has led to a misaligned competitive relationship between China and the US in the field of development financing in Africa.”

Nonetheless, Miao’s insights and the way she lays out the issues are important because they provide valuable clues into the current trends in mainstream Chinese thinking about competition with the US and the role that regions like Africa play in the Great Power competition that scholars like Miao dedicate most of their time analysing.

US = Bad, China = Good

The main narrative thread that extends through Miao’s paper is the notion that US objectives in Africa are defined by selfish political-military interests. In contrast, China’s ambitions are presented as more focused on fostering mutually beneficial development.

“The US regards Africa as an important energy supply base and anti-terrorism frontier and is committed to consolidating its global leadership by strengthening the US-Africa partnership,” she writes. “In contrast, China emphasises mutual benefit and win-win results and regards Africa as an important stage for implementing the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative and building a community with a shared future for mankind… China’s strategy in Africa not only pursues economic interests but also emphasises political cooperation and common development.”

Miao also draws on several longstanding Chinese frustrations with US international leadership, particularly related to the notion of “universal values” that has bristled Beijing for years in response to Western accusations of human rights and other alleged governance abuses.

“The US advocates so-called ‘universal values’ such as ‘democracy’, ‘good governance’ and ‘human rights’ and attempts to incorporate Africa into a rules-based liberal order, while China adheres to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and emphasises equality, mutual benefit and common development,” she writes.

Pursue hegemony while containing China

While Miao’s paper was ostensibly focused on development finance issues, the bulk of her writing seemingly focused less on economic themes and more on Sino-US geopolitical competition in Africa. She drew on oft-used Chinese government talking points to make the case that Washington is far less concerned with the welfare of African people and instead uses its development programmes to counter Beijing’s presence on the continent.

“China’s growing influence in Africa has aroused great concern in the US. Therefore, the focus of the official development financing policy of the US has gradually shifted from promoting African development to containing China,” she writes.

Driven by the Cold War mentality, the US regards China’s growing influence in Africa as a challenge to its dominance and believes that China is trying to increase its political influence in Africa through “debt traps”, thereby undermining the liberal international order centred on the US.

Miao either ignores or is not familiar with the strategic pivot that took place in Washington during the Biden administration, where China’s role in the US foreign policy towards Africa was significantly downplayed. During visits to the continent by US President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, all three avoided making references to the Chinese and only addressed the issue when asked by reporters in the US travelling press corps.

Development finance

It is apparent from Miao’s paper that she is not a development finance specialist as she continually reverts to her primary area of expertise related to great power rivalry and competition. Her framing of the issue, which is very much in line with mainstream political and academic thinking on this topic, is somewhat reductive in how she positives US and Chinese alignment in Africa.

“Based on the interests of maintaining hegemony, the official development financing policy of the US has shown a tendency to be politicised and militarised,” the report said. “In contrast, as a rising power, China’s official development financing focuses more on economic interests and is committed to achieving common development between China and Africa.”

In Miao’s view, “common development” only produces positive outcomes in her narrative as she never alludes to the difficulties that some African countries like Angola, Zambia, and Kenya, among others, have encountered managing their debts to Chinese creditors in recent years.

“In China’s economic strategy toward Africa, official development financing plays the role of ‘pioneer’ and ‘catalyst’,” she wrote. “By providing preferential loans, equity investment and other means, China not only helps Africa overcome development obstacles but also creates favourable conditions for Chinese companies to participate in Africa’s development. China-Africa cooperation has become a model of South-South cooperation.”

Why is this important?

There’s little in Miao’s paper that will surprise experienced Africa-China watchers, as many of the themes that she addressed in the paper are not new. What is important here, though, is the way that she’s constructed the argument that presents the US in somewhat reductive, simplistic terms, with Africa more as a venue for competition and China as a noble power.