As Indonesia prepares to host the second Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF) from September 1-3, 2024, questions arise about the efficacy and motivations behind Jakarta’s African engagement strategy. While rooted in historical ties dating back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, Indonesia’s efforts to engage with African countries have evolved from the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) to the current IAF, reflecting a shift from principled solidarity to pragmatic economic pursuits.

The upcoming IAF, rescheduled from its original May date, will see Indonesia host representatives from just 28 African countries – a far cry from the 47 African nations that attended the first IAF in 2018. This declining participation stands in stark contrast to other major external powers’ forums in Africa, such as Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), South Korea’s Korea-Africa Forum (KOAF), and India’s India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS).

The discrepancy highlights the challenges Indonesia faces in establishing itself as a significant player on the continent. Crucially, the IAF is not recognized by or coordinated with the African Union, unlike the aforementioned summits. This lack of continental endorsement may explain the waning interest from African countries and underscores Indonesia’s limited capacity to offer substantial economic incentives or development assistance comparable to those provided by China, Japan, or India.

Recent trade data from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs paints a sobering picture. In 2023, Indonesia’s trade value with Africa stood at a mere $13.7 billion – just 2.9 percent of overall trade, the lowest ratio among all regions, including Oceania and the Pacific. Indonesia’s exports to Africa, at $4.9 billion, were the second-lowest of any region, while imports from Africa were the lowest at $6.9 billion. Strikingly, Africa-Indonesia trade accounts for less than 4 percent of Indonesia’s overall trade with the Asia-Pacific (East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, plus Oceania and the Pacific), with East Asia and Southeast Asia dominating the trade landscape.

These figures stand in stark contrast to the achievements of other nations engaging with Africa. For instance, in 2023, Africa-China trade reached $282 billion, Africa-India trade was $103 billion, and Africa-Japan trade was $20 billion.

Indonesia’s Africa strategy, as outlined in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Plan for 2020-2024, emphasizes economic diplomacy through initiatives like the IAF, Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue (IAMD), and Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID). The goal is to access non-traditional markets, focusing on sectors such as infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and oil and gas. However, this approach may be overly ambitious given Indonesia’s limited economic and diplomatic resources. While the first IAF in 2018 secured business deals worth $1.9 billion, the trend seems to be declining, raising questions about the sustainability of this engagement model.

The narrative of Asian-African solidarity, rooted in the 1955 Bandung Conference, remains a cornerstone of Indonesia’s Africa policy. This shared historical legacy, which arguably sparked independence movements across Africa, is perhaps Indonesia’s unique value proposition in its engagement with the continent. However, in today’s geopolitical landscape, historical ties alone may not be sufficient to drive meaningful economic partnerships.

Indonesia’s attempts to engage Africa through multilateral mechanisms have met with limited success. The NAASP, created in 2005 and revived in 2015, failed to gain traction due to divergent priorities between its co-chairs, Indonesia and South Africa. While Indonesia pushed for a focus on the Palestine issue, South Africa prioritized economic, trade, and investment matters. This failure of regional coordination explains Indonesia’s pivot to more bilateral and pragmatic approaches like the IAF, marking a clear shift from principle-based engagement to economic pragmatism.

As Indonesia prepares for a political transition, with President-elect Prabowo Subianto set to take office in October, the future of the country’s Africa policy remains uncertain. While Prabowo was notably the only presidential candidate to mention Africa during campaign debates, he also emphasized a “Good Neighbor” policy, suggesting a potential refocus in Indonesia’s foreign policy approach.

In light of these factors, it’s worth questioning whether Indonesia’s African ambitions represent a strategic miscalculation. The resources and diplomatic energy expended on initiatives like the IAF might yield greater returns if redirected toward deepening integration and addressing challenges within ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The upcoming IAF will serve as a litmus test for the viability of Indonesia’s Africa strategy. If it fails to produce concrete outcomes or significantly boost economic ties, it may be time for Indonesia to recalibrate its approach. As Indonesia navigates its place in a changing global order, it must balance ambition with pragmatism. While engagement with Africa shouldn’t be abandoned entirely, a more targeted and realistic approach – one that aligns more closely with Indonesia’s economic capabilities and core strategic interests – may be the wisest path forward.

Ultimately, Indonesia’s engagement with Africa reflects a broader tension in its foreign policy between historical principles and contemporary economic realities. The outcome of this year’s IAF will likely shape the future trajectory of this relationship, determining whether Indonesia can transform its historical ties into meaningful economic partnerships or whether it needs to reassess its priorities in an increasingly competitive global landscape.