For decades, the Western Sahara was never a priority for the US. Folded into the broad Middle East and North Africa (MENA) bucket, the Maghreb sat on the edge of Washington’s main concerns: Israel’s security, Gulf energy security and the balance with Iran.

The Western Saharan conflict was watched from afar, left to the UN and to regional dynamics, with steady political backing for Morocco but no push to settle it.

US President Donald Trump breaks with that habit for three reasons:

• Lock in the Abraham Accords
• Contain China and Russia
• Shore up a Sahel that is coming apart

Trump’s 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty was a quid pro quo for Rabat’s normalisation with Tel Aviv. Back in office, he wants to bolt that link into place – essential if he is to extend his regional design.

Brahim Oumansour, who heads the Maghreb Observatory at the French IRIS think-tank, notes that renewed US interest does not make the Western Sahara a vital issue in itself.

Rather, it now cuts across several strands of US foreign policy. A frozen conflict in the Maghreb complicates efforts to deepen convergences around Israel, to hem in rival powers and to steady the Sahelian flank.

On that view, Washington does not want to open an uncertain institutional process or risk the birth of a fragile new state with unpredictable leanings. A referendum looks too risky. Autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is judged the most “realistic” option – even if it cannot be forced on Algiers.

Think-tanks running hot, diplomacy on a short rein

Since the spring, two papers have fed talk of an “imminent end” to the conflict.

Building a lasting peace between two great Maghreb nations, united by history and shared challenges

A note from Spanish think-tank Coordenadas says 2025 is a historic window to lock in autonomy. Another, from the Hudson Institute, close to US neoconservative circles, urges maximum pressure on Algiers: list the Polisario Front as a foreign terrorist organisation, halt UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) funding and dismantle the Tindouf camps.

These readings, plainly aligned with Moroccan interests, reflect ideology more than real diplomatic signals.

The Spanish paper reprises a constant Madrid worry: remaining a pivot in the Maghreb’s new balance. The Hudson note casts the Sahara as one front in a wider clash with the Iran-Russia-China axis.

Maximalist scenarios meet hard constraints, says Oumansour. Over the past five years, America’s most structured partnerships in the region have been with Algeria – energy, business and defence. Security ties, notably intelligence, are tight.

In 2022 the US refused to trigger sanctions sought by Congress over Algerian imports of Russian arms, to avoid pushing Algiers further into Beijing’s and Moscow’s orbit. Washington does not want to break Algeria, but to coax it into a minimum deescalation with Rabat.

That is the thrust of messages carried by Massad Boulos, presidential adviser for Africa and the Middle East, who has called for “building a lasting peace between two great Maghreb nations, united by history and the shared challenges of the 21st century”. The US approach is: persuade, don’t coerce.

To grasp Trump’s haste, look south of the Sahara. The Sahel holds some of the world’s most strategic resources: gold in Mali and Burkina Faso; lithium in Mali – a key energy-transition metal; uranium in Niger; and critical minerals in Mauritania. The Africa Minerals Development Centre counts these deposits among the most promising on the continent – but they sit in zones of extreme insecurity.

The region has become a playground for power competition: China advances through investment; Russia entrenches via Africa Corps (formerly Wagner-linked structures) and mining outfits; jihadist groups gain ground; military juntas fall back.

Even Algiers eyes Russia’s reach warily, given poor results in Mali and Niger – a rare point of overlap with Washington. In this setting, the US has launched a diplomatic counter-move.

An ‘American solution’ to jihadism

Since early this year, US officials have shuttled to Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey to pitch an “American solution” to jihadist violence. Citing diplomats quoted by AFP, some ideas include taking out jihadist leaders in exchange for secure access for US companies to lithium and gold.

Middle East Eye notes that US private contractors such as Berry Aviation and Erickson already plug into the Sahel set-up, handling tactical lift, logistics and medevac. Analyst Boubacar Haidara argues the stakes go beyond mining: for the US, the Sahel is strategic ground.

This economic diplomacy sits within a bigger plan: to secure an Atlantic corridor linking Sahel resources to stable seaports – above all in Morocco.

The deep-water Dakhla Atlantic port, designed as a regional export platform, is meant to give landlocked Sahel states – Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso – vital access to the ocean. For Washington, it is a key logistics spine to protect mineral flows from disruption and insecurity.

On this reading, the Sahara dispute is the lock on the door. As long as Rabat and Algiers remain stuck in rigid confrontation, US projection into the Sahel is cramped – whether in security cooperation, logistics corridors or access to minerals.

Trump does not need to “solve” the conflict – only to keep it at a manageable simmer. Time is short: the 2026 midterms loom and could curb the president’s room for manoeuvre.