Since the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan’s mineral and extractive industries have assumed growing strategic importance in the broader context of sustaining the country’s fragile economy. The abrupt loss of access to international financial assistance, the freezing of foreign-held assets, and the enforced curtailment of opium poppy cultivation have pushed the Taliban leadership to refocus on domestic resources, particularly the country’s vast mineral reserves. Yet, there is little indication that the Taliban intend to pursue full-scale exploitation or large-scale export of these resources in the immediate term. Rather, their approach appears deliberately cautious, treating Afghanistan’s natural wealth less as a means of short-term economic gain and more as a tool of political leverage and diplomatic bargaining on the international stage.

Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth

According to estimates by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the total potential value of Afghanistan’s mineral resources exceeds $1 trillion. More than 1,400 deposits have been identified across all 34 provinces of the country. The Hajigak iron ore deposit alone is believed to contain up to 2 billion metric tons of high-grade ore. Even more significant is the Mes Aynak copper deposit in Logar Province, which holds over 12 million metric tons of copper – resources valued at more than $50 billion on the global market. Particularly noteworthy are the country’s substantial lithium reserves, located primarily in the provinces of Ghazni, Nuristan, and Helmand. Afghanistan also possesses approximately 47 oil wells, with the majority concentrated in the Sar-e Pol, Sheberghan, and Amu Darya basins.

Official data indicate that the extractive sector has already attracted roughly 10 billion Afghanis (around $110 million) in domestic investment, in addition to over $7 billion in foreign direct investment. The mining sector has emerged as a vital source of employment, officially providing jobs for an estimated 150,000 Afghan citizens. This endows the industry with not only economic significance but also pronounced social relevance – especially against the backdrop of protracted unemployment and severely limited access to international assistance.

Beyond its economic significance, Afghanistan’s mineral and extractive sector is acquiring a clear political dimension. In the context of a rapidly accelerating global transition to low-carbon energy and the growing demand for strategic resources – such as lithium, copper, and rare earth elements – Afghanistan’s geoeconomic importance is on the rise. This potential has drawn the attention of a range of regional and global actors, including China, Russia, Iran, the Central Asian republics, Pakistan, and India.

At the same time, the Taliban appear to be leveraging this external interest as a means of advancing their own political objectives. Bilateral engagement in exploration and extraction is often accompanied by negotiations over legal frameworks that, in the long term, may serve as a pathway toward the international recognition of Taliban rule. This may explain the Taliban’s apparent reluctance to engage in full-scale exploitation of the sector. No external actor appears to have offered formal recognition in exchange for a comprehensive partnership in developing the fields. However, limited agreements with some foreign stakeholders have begun to emerge, indicating a cautious but strategic approach by the Taliban to align resource diplomacy with political objectives.

External Players in Afghanistan

China

China has emerged as one of the most active external economic actors engaged in Afghanistan’s mineral resource sector. The Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC) is implementing a 25-year oil extraction agreement in Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Simultaneously, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) continues to pursue the long-delayed Mes Aynak copper mining project, one of the country’s most significant undeveloped deposits.

Particular attention is being directed toward the development of Afghanistan’s lithium reserves. As the global leader in electric vehicle manufacturing and the largest producer and exporter of lithium-ion batteries, China views access to lithium as a critical component of its technological security. In this regard, active negotiations are underway between Chinese companies and Afghan authorities concerning the potential development of several lithium mining sites.

China’s deepening involvement in Afghanistan’s extractive industries also aligns with Beijing’s broader strategy of integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative. This could facilitate the creation of new logistical corridors and enhance China’s geoeconomic influence across Central and South Asia.

India

India has demonstrated growing interest in importing Afghan copper and iron ore, as well as in potential cooperation in uranium extraction. Against the backdrop of New Delhi’s ambition to transform India into the world’s third-largest economy and consolidate its status as a global power, the development of the national nuclear sector has assumed strategic importance.

The escalation of the Kashmir crisis in 2025, coupled with Pakistan’s display of comparable military and technological capabilities, has further reinforced India’s determination to enhance its nuclear posture as part of a broader regional deterrence strategy.

In this context, Afghanistan is increasingly viewed as a potential partner in the supply of uranium resources. It is conceivable that, should favorable terms be offered – particularly discounted access to strategic materials such as uranium – India might consider a degree of political rapprochement with the Taliban, possibly extending to partial recognition of their authority. Such a move would not only secure India’s access to critical minerals but also provide a geopolitical lever to exert pressure on Pakistan, especially in light of the continued strain in Islamabad-Kabul relations.

Russia

The Russian Federation is exploring avenues to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan’s energy sector, particularly in oil and gas exploration and production, with a focus on the country’s northern provinces – Sar-e Pul, Balkh, Kunduz, and Baghlan. These regions, historically linked to the Soviet Union, represent potential zones of renewed Russian economic influence. In May 2025, the Russian company Intek? Group signed an agreement with Afghan authorities on joint oil extraction and processing, marking a step toward deeper energy cooperation.

Beyond the economic dimension, Russia is pursuing broader geopolitical objectives aimed at reinforcing its influence in Central Asia and neighboring regions amid a shifting balance of power. Moscow’s return to Afghanistan’s energy sector is thus part of a larger strategic effort to solidify its regional presence and counterbalance the growing involvement of other major powers in the region.

Iran

Iran maintains considerable influence in Afghanistan’s western provinces and is positioning itself to play an active role in transport and logistics projects related to the transit of Afghan mineral resources. Tehran is particularly focused on leveraging its transport infrastructure – most notably the port of Chabahar – as a strategic corridor for exporting Afghan raw materials to markets in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

Rather than prioritizing direct involvement in resource extraction, Iran’s approach centers on controlling key transit routes. This strategy enables Tehran to expand its economic footprint in the region and strengthen its role within emerging multilateral logistical frameworks. By positioning itself as a critical intermediary in regional trade, Iran seeks to enhance its geopolitical relevance amid evolving patterns of connectivity and commerce.

Pakistan

Pakistan maintains active ties with Afghanistan’s southern regions and has shown a marked interest in energy cooperation. Islamabad is particularly focused on the Ab-e-Istada – Ghazni area, which hosts significant reserves of iron ore and coal with substantial industrial value.

At the strategic level, Pakistan continues to support participation in two major regional energy initiatives – the TAPI gas pipeline and the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project. These efforts are vital to addressing persistent energy shortages in Pakistan’s northern provinces. However, despite its interest in Afghanistan’s resource base, Islamabad remains cautious and is also exploring alternative energy import routes. This prudence reflects concerns over the Taliban’s unpredictability and the potential for Kabul to leverage energy cooperation as a political tool, possibly imposing conditions or restricting access during periods of bilateral tension.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan possesses considerable potential to engage in the joint development of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits, including hydrocarbons and non-ferrous metals, particularly copper. Energy cooperation could become a key component of Tashkent’s policy in northern Afghanistan – a region historically and culturally linked to Central Asia.

Uzbekistan’s advantages in this context are threefold. First, the two countries have extensive experience of cooperation in the energy sector, as Uzbekistan has historically provided Afghanistan with assistance in this domain. This foundation of trust and technical collaboration strengthens prospects for broader resource-based partnerships. Second, given that Afghanistan’s extractive industry remains underdeveloped, Kabul can rely on Uzbekistan’s logistical and processing capacities – particularly the Ayritom Special Economic Zone in Termez – for mineral processing and subsequent export through Uzbek territory. Third, Uzbekistan is well-positioned to help build Afghanistan’s human capital by training specialists such as geologists, engineers, and energy experts, while also supplying its own technical and engineering support to facilitate exploration and production efforts.

Conclusion

The extractive sector has emerged as one of Afghanistan’s primary sources of revenue in the current phase of its development. Beyond its economic significance, it also carries important social dimensions, particularly through the creation of employment opportunities. Afghanistan’s abundant mineral wealth – especially in lithium, copper, and uranium – has attracted considerable interest from both regional and global actors.

However, the Taliban authorities have shown a measured and strategic approach to fully exploiting these resources. It appears that the mineral sector is being treated not merely as a source of income, but as a geopolitical tool in pursuit of international recognition. To date, no single foreign actor has been granted exclusive access or preferential contracts in the sector. This suggests that the Taliban leadership may be seeking more than financial returns – they seem intent on leveraging mineral concessions for political dividends. And the involvement of multiple international actors in the sector indicates that Kabul is seeking not the recognition of a single power, but rather broad-based legitimacy from a diverse array of states.