Over the past decade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Myanmar have focused on the development of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a major infrastructure project designed to connect China’s Yunnan Province to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. The corridor includes roads, rail links, pipelines, and the upgrading of the Kyaukpyu deep-water port in the Bay of Bengal. The Chinese authorities have remained enthusiastic about CMEC because the corridor has the potential to improve trade efficiency, boost China’s geopolitical influence, elbow out potential competitors such as the United States and India, and enhance China’s energy security by offering an alternative route for oil imports (a partial solution to China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’).

The overriding geopolitical imperative here is not securing access to cheap resources, as there are plenty of critical mineral and energy hubs at other legs of BRI. Rather, the key prize of CMEC is gaining meaningful direct access to the Indian Ocean so as to diversify China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the short-term and project maritime power westward in the medium-term. In this, the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline, running from the Kyaukpyu port on Myanmar’s west coast to China’s Yunnan Province is the key strategic feature of CMEC, as it would allow energy imports from the Middle East to bypass the Malacca Strait in the event of a US Navy blockade.

The Pre-Coup Outlook for CMEC

The CMEC corridor already faced significant pushback before the 2021 outbreak of the Myanmar civil war due in large part to public concern over the environmental and social impacts of large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects, notably the controversial Myitsone Dam. In 2019, thousands of people in Kachin State, including students, elders, church leaders, and internally displaced people, called for the project’s permanent suspension. They cited concerns about displacement, environmental damage, and the destruction of cultural heritage. The protests also featured demands for greater transparency in the negotiations between the Myanmar government and the Chinese developer.

In response to the protest movement, the Myanmar government, then under the National League for Democracy (NLD), sought to address concerns by renegotiating several projects, including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, to better balance private and public benefit. However, long-running ethnic conflicts, particularly between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups (EAGs) like the Arakan Army in Rakhine State, continued to pose a threat to the security of CMEC infrastructure. Despite China’s efforts to mediate peace talks between the Myanmar government and ethnic groups, the escalation of these conflicts created an increasingly fraught environment for the CMEC’s long-term viability.

One of the main reasons China’s peace negotiations failed then, and continue to fail now, is that Beijing focuses solely on mediating a cessation of hostilities in order to protect its investments, refusing to address the root causes of the conflict. Prior to the coup, many EAOs were seeking either independence or, at the very least, greater autonomy from the State Administration Council. Meanwhile, many civilians, who had not taken up arms, were pushing for democracy. Since the coup, many EAOs have shifted toward demanding a degree of autonomy within a hybrid form of federal democracy, which aligns with the desires of the broader civilian and ethnic populations. This is reflected in their overwhelming support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in both the 2015 and 2020 elections. China’s call for both sides to cease fighting near its projects failed to take these deeper political grievances into account. As a result, the fighting not only continued but intensified after the coup.

The Post-Coup Outlook for CMEC

Following the 2021 outbreak of civil war, the junta-run State Administration Council (SAC) initially continued some CMEC projects. However, amid escalating political unrest and armed conflict, securing and supplying the projects became impossible. While China supported the SAC’s continuation of the CMEC, growing resistance from anti-junta groups and EAOs put Chinese investments at significant risk. Attacks on Chinese interests have taken place, for example, Myanmar’s largest nickel mine and processing plant in Tagaung, which was attacked by rebels in 2022 and eventually seized outright by rebels in August of 2024. More recently, in mid-October, the Chinese diplomatic mission in Mandalay’s Chanmyathazi Township was attacked by unknown assailants, further illustrating a general rise in anti-Chinese sentiment among rebel groups.

The junta is now estimated to have control of around 86% of Myanmar’s territory. Despite efforts by the SAC to bolster security around key infrastructure, attacks on the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas pipelines and other vital installations continue to highlight the fragility of CMEC projects amid the Myanmar civil war.

China’s Response

Amid this deteriorating outlook for CMEC, China has sought to develop alternative trade routes, such as a new maritime link between Guangxi and the port of Yangon. Beijing has also adjusted to focus on developing less conflict-prone areas. However, these pivots are far less direct (and thus less efficient) than the CMEC route as originally envisioned, and they ultimately remain vulnerable to the very same conflicts undermining the broader corridor. Furthermore, as resistance forces continue to gain ground, it appears only a matter of time before major cities like Mandalay, Yangon, and Naypyidaw come under attack.

Beijing has attempted to broker peace agreements and ceasefires, even inviting various militia leaders to China for talks. These efforts have at times swayed some of the more powerful groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and convinced them to support a ceasefire. However, the future of the CMEC ultimately depends on China’s ability to restore order in Myanmar—a task that seems increasingly impossible given the resolve of the ethnic armed organizations, which are supported by the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and the majority of the civilian population. China’s continued support of the junta, through arms and financial aid, has prevented its collapse, but this has only served to prolong the conflict. What Beijing ultimately needs is for the war to end, with Myanmar coming under the control of a government that is favorable to trade and investment with China, and that can persuade the population to accept Chinese investment. Yet over the short term, such an outcome appears unlikely.