Via Foreign Policy, an article on Russia’s scuttled plans for a Red Sea Naval Base in Sudan:

Russia’s hopes of establishing a naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest waterways, have run aground, according to two U.S. intelligence officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. 

U.S. officials have closely been eyeing the deal between Moscow and Khartoum, which was first made public in late 2020. If it went through, it would grant Russia a strategic foothold on the Red Sea, where some 30 percent of the world’s container traffic passes each year. The naval base would be Russia’s first in Africa, which U.S. officials feared Moscow could use to project power further afield into the Indian Ocean.

Russia’s Red Sea naval ambitions appear to have run afoul of complicated internal dynamics within Sudan’s military leadership, which took power from a civilian-led transitional government following a coup in October last year. Although the deputy head of the country’s ruling military council, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemeti—has embraced Moscow, the coup leader and de facto head of state, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has sought to avoid alienating the West and his other key allies in the region, including Egypt. 

“They’re very hesitant to give them access to this port. They continue to try and delay and do delay tactics,” said a U.S. intelligence official. “We see it as unlikely that the Port Sudan deal is going to be done anytime in the near future and that Russia is potentially looking to seek other options if Port Sudan doesn’t work out.”

Russia has made significant inroads in Africa in recent years as part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to expand his country’s global influence despite its dwindling soft power and anemic economy. Even as Moscow pours its military resources into its botched invasion of Ukraine, it has expanded its footprint in unstable regions and conflict zones in Africa, including Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic. It has leveraged arms sales, disinformation campaigns, and the so-called mercenary Wagner Group, widely viewed as a proxy for the Russian military—giving the Kremlin an outside impact relative to its tiny foreign direct investment in the continent. 

“Russia has arguably gained more influence in Africa over the last several years than any other external actor,” said Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Thursday. 

Discussions over the Russian naval base in Sudan have fluctuated over the years, leading some analysts to question whether it is truly off the table. “I think what the Sudanese military is trying to do is play all sides,” Siegle told Foreign Policy. “They want to flirt with the Russians, but at the same time, I think the military realizes that the Russians don’t bring a whole lot, that any money, any investment capital, is going to have to come from getting the Western donors back on board.”

The Sudanese Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for the U.S. State Department said, “Moving forward with such a naval agreement or any other form of security cooperation with Russia would further isolate Sudan’s military regime and undermine stability in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region.”

Talks between Putin and former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir about negotiating a possible Russian naval presence in Sudan began in 2017. Following Bashir’s ouster in a popular uprising in 2019, the deal was put on ice as a transitional government sought to end the country’s international isolation. In late 2020, Moscow appeared to unilaterally sign and publish a copy of the 25-year basing agreement in an apparent effort to force Sudan’s hand. 

A copy of the agreement called for allowing Moscow to keep up to four naval vessels based on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. In exchange, Russia would have provided Sudan with military equipment and other government assistance.