The Thai government under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin has made soft power — the ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion — a cornerstone of its economic agenda. To help kickstart a stagnant Thai economy, the government is focusing on the economic aspects of soft power to bolster tourism and consumption within the Kingdom.

As of 2024, Thailand has lost its status as a major player in ASEAN and its international image has been severely damaged due to 17 years of political instability and coups. The issue at hand is how Thailand can regain its influence and status.

The ‘5 Fs’ policy — formulated by the previous government in 2022 — outlined food, films, fashion, fighting and festivals as areas for Thai soft power accumulation and possible projection. The 2024 Thai government is broadening the scope of the plan through the National Soft Power Strategy Committee. 

The committee has drafted some ‘odd’ initiatives — such as ‘One Family One Soft Power’ — with the hope of generating 20 million jobs, as well as fresh ideas such as celebrating Songkran for an entire month.

The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs was central in raising the global status of Muay Thai, making Thai culture a known entity and getting Muay Thai listed as an Olympic sport. While Thailand has lots to offer and a wealth of talent to draw upon, the continued effectiveness of these strategies in enhancing its image and broadening its influence is an open question.

The fifth iteration of the Global Soft Power Index — released in 2024 — could shed some light on what works for a successful soft power push. The index shows that Thailand’s ranking has been relatively stable around the 40th spot, while also acknowledging that more countries have been added in the past few years.

Thailand scored 6.8 out of 10 in familiarity, 6.3 in reputation and 4.2 in influence. The latter is not great, but it is in line with comparable countries, especially considering Thailand’s long period of political instability.

Yet, when investigating more specific subcategories, it is evident that Thailand performs better in business and trade, as well as culture and heritage. Recognition of its people and values is above average and its media and communication capabilities are acceptable, but it fails to deliver when it comes to governance and education and science. It should be noted that the index merges objective metrics, such as scientific publications and standardised test results, with subjective perceptions obtained through global surveys.

As the Thai government attempts to implement various strategies to improve the country’s image and reputation abroad, it should think carefully about relying on overtly government-sponsored initiatives, as the index clearly shows governance as one of its weakest points.

It is widely acknowledged that ‘most of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government’. Even in South Korea, where the role of the government in promoting soft power has been recognised, the country’s success is largely attributed to its subtle support in the background while it let the private sector and people’s creativity take the lead.

The government should be seen as an enabler of public diplomacy and nation-branding strategies. Yet, a constant stream of claims in the media about how they plan to gain more soft power, may not result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially when the term is misused and diluted in a variety of ways.

It is laudable that the government is seeking help and has agreed to cooperate with South Korea in soft power. Regardless of the chosen strategy, it should be discussed internally and executed discreetly rather than talked about incessantly.

Another challenge for Srettha’s soft power strategy is whether Thailand will gain more soft power and overall legitimacy amid restricted freedom of speech and the forthcoming judicialisation of politics against the popular Move Forward Party.

Thailand has the potential to attract foreign audiences in a variety of ways. Yet, doubts linger regarding the effectiveness of relentlessly pursuing this form of power through half-baked initiatives, when resources could be better distributed towards weaker categories that would allow Thailand to punch above its weight.

The government unveiled its short-term soft power play by announcing the Maha Songkran Water Festival 2024. This government-directed activity will extend Thailand’s Songkran water festival for the entire month of April, with each of Thailand’s 77 provinces organising Songkran festivals and activities according to the local culture. 

Over five billion Baht has been allocated to take Songkran ‘global’ in terms of recognition. This initiative, while smelling of massive cultural appropriation, shows that Thailand is drawing on its indigenous strengths — people, culture and smiles — to reimagine Thailand in the post-junta era.

In the short term, we should be able to see if a month of water-splashing for future Songkran celebrations will be well-received by the people and the media alike. But it will take more forward-thinking strategies to address the ingrained shortcomings of Thailand’s soft power, such as governance.