Strategically perched on the Gulf of Aden just across from Yemen, Berbera, in Somaliland, is emerging as one of the Horn of Africa’s most coveted assets. As global attention remains fixed on the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks have disrupted shipping lanes and threatened one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints, the lesser-known port city is quietly drawing the interest of military planners and policymakers alike.

Berbera, a once-sleepy port in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, lies just a few hundred kilometres from the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow chokepoint through which 10-12% of global trade flows. Its proximity to this critical juncture has made it increasingly attractive to regional and global powers navigating the fallout of the Red Sea crisis.

“Berbera’s position gives it enormous strategic value,” says Federico Manfredi Firmian, a foreign policy expert and research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. “With the Houthis continuing to threaten commercial shipping, Berbera offers a potential base for monitoring and protecting key trade routes.”

Berbera’s proximity to Yemen makes it well-positioned to monitor Iranian and Houthi activity in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb, adds Liam Karr, Africa team lead at Critical Threats.

Port of interest

Berbera’s transformation began in earnest in 2017 when Somaliland signed a $442m deal with DP World to modernise and manage its port. The agreement, which also included a logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia, marked the first major international investment in Somaliland’s infrastructure. Since then, the port has seen steady development: new container terminals, expanded berths and a deep-water capability that rivals Djibouti’s port to the north.

For Ethiopia, which has relied almost exclusively on Djibouti for maritime trade since losing Eritrea’s coastline in the 1990s, Berbera offers a critical alternative. In early 2024, Addis Ababa signed a controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that hinted at future port access and, potentially, even recognition of the self-declared republic. The deal sparked fierce opposition in Mogadishu and drew regional attention.

America eyes the Horn

Now, Berbera’s geostrategic importance has drawn in a new player: the US. With Houthi attacks disrupting Red Sea shipping lanes and threatening global maritime security, Washington has responded with increased naval deployments. The USS Carl Vinson and USS Harry S. Truman, two US aircraft carriers, are reportedly operating in the Gulf of Aden, along with guided-missile destroyers already engaging threats in the region.

Though the US has not formally acknowledged any arrangement with Somaliland, the presence of American warships off its coast is raising eyebrows and questions.

The US has long maintained a significant military footprint in nearby Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, its largest permanent base in Africa. While the US Department of Defence has scouted Berbera in recent years as a potential site for expansion, its intentions remain opaque.

Under the Trump administration, which favoured a “light footprint” approach to military engagements, Firmian says the idea of securing additional bases may have seemed unnecessary. But with attacks on Red Sea shipping intensifying, the calculation could shift, he adds.

“Recent US naval deployments and broader strategic moves suggest Washington is considering a greater military role in the Horn of Africa, though the extent remains uncertain,” Firmian tells The Africa Report.

Diplomatic fault lines

The latest developments have sparked a political fallout in Mogadishu, where the Somali federal government, despite not controlling Berbera, has accused Somaliland of bypassing national sovereignty.

A leaked March 2025 letter from Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to the US offered Trump “exclusive operational access” to Berbera as well as Bosaso port in Puntland, an offer critics say was made without any actual control over either.

This, according to Firmian, suggests an attempt by Somalia to undercut any American engagement that could be construed as recognising Somaliland’s de facto independence.

Meanwhile, Somaliland responded with outrage, denouncing the move as a “foolish interference” and a “desperate distortion of reality”. The region maintains it has operated as an independent state since 1991, despite the lack of international recognition.

Adding fuel to the fire, US Africa policy expert J. Peter Pham publicly slammed Mogadishu’s claims in a tweet, calling Somalia “a $1bn yearly drain on US taxpayers” and warning that “Hassan Sheikh thinks … he can offer us ports he doesn’t even control”.

Double-edged sword

For Somaliland, the attention is a double-edged sword. On one hand, the territory has spent decades trying to parlay its relative stability and strategic location into international recognition and investment. The UAE, through its logistics giant DP World, has already invested heavily in Berbera’s port infrastructure, hoping to turn it into a regional trade hub.

The investment, according to Somaliland analyst Salman Caaro, is “arguably the most significant economic project” in Somaliland’s history, serving as both an economic engine and a political statement. Turkiye, too, has shown interest.

But as global powers — including China and Russia — jockey for influence along the Red Sea corridor, the risks of entanglement are growing, says Firmian, adding that increased foreign presence could inflame internal divisions within Somaliland about the terms of military and economic partnerships.

Tensions with Somalia over the Ethiopia deal have already deepened, and further escalation could drag the region into a wider diplomatic and military standoff.

“Additionally, competition between the US, China and Russia over influence in the Red Sea corridor may further complicate Somaliland’s strategic positioning, potentially leading to entanglement in new conflicts,” Firmian says. “Increased foreign involvement could also provoke internal political divisions over the terms of such engagements, potentially endangering Somaliland’s stability.”

While direct competition between the US and its geopolitical rivals may not be playing out explicitly in Berbera, the broader race for strategic port access in the Red Sea and along the Indian Ocean seaboard is accelerating. According to Connor Trumpold, East and Horn of Africa analyst at Control Risks, the real contest lies between major commercial operators, many with strong state backing.

“The UAE’s DP World is seeking to establish a string of ports across the Indian Ocean seaboard, and Chinese port operators have also won concessions in the same region,” he says. “Both the UAE’s and China’s commercial port operators have significant state backing – both financially and diplomatically – for these endeavours, something that US companies do not typically have.”

As Africa’s markets expand and global shipping routes become increasingly central to great-power competition, Trumpold expects the battle for influence over ports like Berbera to intensify in an increasingly transactional and multipolar world.

Other actors are also expressing interest. Israel has been actively seeking strategic partnerships with Somaliland to enhance its national security and counter Houthi’s threats in the Red Sea.

The UAE already established a military base near the port to support its military intervention against the Houthis in the Yemeni civil war in 2017.

“Somaliland sees this as a moment of opportunity,” Firmian says. “But the more players get involved, the more volatile the situation becomes. Berbera could become not just a strategic asset, but a flashpoint.”

Analyst Caaro agrees, warning that “if too many external actors gain stakes in Berbera, Somaliland could find itself navigating conflicting interests that limit its room for independent decision-making”.

Recognition on the horizon?

US civilian and military engagement with Somaliland has increased markedly since Donald Trump’s first term, raising the prospect of deeper ties with the self-declared republic.

While Washington has long maintained a “One Somalia” policy, a growing number of Trump-aligned policymakers — both in Congress and within the executive branch — have begun to openly advocate for US recognition of Somaliland, says security analyst Karr.

“Greater US engagement with Somaliland would ultimately strengthen Somaliland’s claim for recognition by further incorporating it into the regional and international maritime economic and security architecture,” he says.

However, international recognition for Somaliland remains unlikely in the near term, says Trumpold. “Somaliland’s path to recognition still faces significant obstacles,” he says. “While some US officials focused on Africa policy may be sympathetic to its cause, others — especially within security circles — are more inclined to prioritise relations with the Federal Government of Somalia, including the semi-autonomous region of Puntland.”

Experts warn that with Berbera now within striking distance of an escalating regional conflict, officials in Hargeisa may have to walk a fine line between opportunity and overexposure.

“If managed wisely, the port can serve as both an economic lifeline and a diplomatic tool, proving to the world that Somaliland is not just a self-sufficient entity but a valuable player in the international arena,” Caaro tells The Africa Report.