The New Influencers: The Expanding Role of Middle Powers in Africa

Courtesy of Harvard’s Belfer Center, a new report on the expanding role of Middle Powers such as Brazil, India, Japan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and Qatar in Africa:

This original primer, conducted as research for The Africa Futures Project, is an initial exploration into the evolving roles and increasing influence of “middle powers” in Africa. It covers a diverse array of existing and aspiring middle powers, presenting key points for each nation under four distinct analytical lenses. The goal of this primer is to provide a foundational overview rather than an exhaustive analysis. Inspired by our preliminary findings, we hope that future research will deepen this analysis, including further studies on how middle powers’ policies in Africa influence the rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and China.

Defining a Middle Power

The term “middle power” is both useful and contested. There is no universally accepted set of middle powers; this largely subjective term generally refers to states that are not considered “great powers” but still exert significant international influence.

This primer examines eight nations that command analytical attention due to their political, economic, or geographic importance toward Africa: BrazilIndiaJapanNorth Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or simply DPRK), Saudi ArabiaTurkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.

Although some of these eight nations would not be considered middle powers in a classical definition, as they wield their influence in Africa, they exhibit attributes of middle or regional powers.[i] They leverage their unique positions among great powers, sometimes below the radar, to amplify their influence with African countries and shape the continent’s future. We describe our chosen countries of analysis as “non-great power states with significant influence in Africa,” a description that, while accurate, is less succinct.

Finally, this primer focuses on the actions of selected middle power nations toward the continent, not the actions of African countries toward these selected middle powers. We also acknowledge that several African countries—such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—could be considered middle powers; however, this primer focuses on external middle powers and their engagement with the continent and African nations rather than intra-African affairs. 

Why a Primer?

For a continent historically shaped by Western European colonizers, our analysis of middle powers extends beyond traditional research. There is an extensive analysis of Russia’s security interests and China’s economic investments in Africa, but there is a limited consolidated analysis of other strategically significant, non-Western actors on the continent. Furthermore, much of the narrative around middle powers focuses on their positioning between China and the U.S. In Africa, however, these nations are developing their own economic, military, and diplomatic relations, sometimes in partnership with the U.S. and China, sometimes in opposition, but often bilaterally. We hope our research sheds light on this less-examined dimension.

Four Analytical Lenses

We analyze the roles of our selected middle powers in Africa through four lenses. These are not comprehensive but rather provide an overview of the nations’ strategies toward the continent.

  1. Historical Context: This analysis considers historical ties and significant trendlines in relationships. It focuses on the period after decolonization but also includes pre-colonial ties, if applicable.
  2. Diplomatic Efforts: This area focuses on diplomatic relations, including the establishment of embassies, the frequency of bilateral visits, soft power projection, involvement in educational exchanges, and participation in regional and international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and BRICS.
  3. Security Engagement: This encompasses military training and joint exercises, arms sales, specific interventions, and contributions to UN peacekeeping forces.
  4. Economic Ties: This includes metrics on public and private foreign direct investment (FDI), loans, infrastructure projects, participation in economic summits, and overall trade and development initiatives.

 

 


[i]  For a traditional, 20th-century definition of “Middle Power,” see Cooper, Andrew F., Higgott, and Nossal. In Between Countries: Australia, Canada, and the Search for Order in Agricultural Trade. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997. Additionally, middle powers have often been characterized by three core characteristics: “international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct.” Quoted from Robertson J, Carr A. “Is anyone a middle power? The case for historicization.” International Theory. 2023; 15(3): 379-403.

 

  • A Needed Emphasis on Middle Powers

    With Africa’s share of the global population projected to reach 25% by 2050, many nations considered “middle powers” recognize the continent’s growing role in their quest for increased geopolitical influence. This primer examines eight countries—BrazilIndiaJapanNorth Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or simply DPRK), Saudi ArabiaTurkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar—that are significant due to their political, economic, or geographic importance to Africa, yet are often under-analyzed in discussions about external powers acting on the continent.

    By predominantly focusing on Russian and Chinese actions on the continent, Western policymakers miss opportunities to view these middle powers as potential allies or counterweights. These states act independently of great powers’ foreign policies, suggesting that long-standing partners of African nations—the U.S., China, and European states—should reevaluate Africa’s dynamically evolving foreign political environment.

    An Alternative to Great Powers

    With Chinese loans to Africa declining and Western aid becoming sparser, middle powers are beginning to fill such vacuums, offering a “third option,” distinct from alliances with superpowers. These nations have the potential to profoundly reshape the continent, driven by national interests that align with those of many African countries. For one, many middle powers and African states share a mutual geopolitical interest in reshaping the global order and international institutions to better represent voices from the Global South. As middle powers pursue diverse agendas, these partnerships are poised to fuel further shifting geopolitical realities.

    Some observers assume that middle powers must choose between alignment with the U.S. or China. In Africa, some actions by middle power states are driven by their relationship with great powers; for example, Japan’s naval participation in U.S.-led counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa augments the U.S.-Japan security relationship in the Pacific. However, most actions by middle power states in Africa serve defined national interests and are agnostic to great power actions. Additionally, there are spaces in Africa where middle power states hold the upper hand, compete directly with larger states, or are the intermediaries that bring great powers like the U.S. or China to the table.

    Geography Supports Geopolitical Freedom

    While the U.S., Russia, and China maintain regional spheres of influence, Africa lies further afield and lacks a regional hegemon. Therefore, it is somewhere a non-African nation can grow its influence without directly antagonizing a great power. Moreover, as superpowers remain preoccupied with competing priorities— including wars in Ukraine and Gaza, domestic political turmoil, or economic slowdowns—middle powers have a growing window of opportunity to exert influence in Africa without provoking conflict with a great power.

    No Middle Powers Consensus

    The eight nations examined in this report do not form a unified bloc; instead, they often compete directly against one another and other countries. In the security domain, Gulf states and Turkey back opposing factions in conflicts in Libya, Sudan, and Somalia. Economically, our eight nations compete for African commodities, while airlines such as Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Turkish Airlines vie to be the air carriers of choice, linking the continent to Asia and beyond. While India and Brazil favor deeper diplomatic ties through established international institutions, like the UN or AU, others prefer bilateral agreements with specific African partners.



This entry was posted on Wednesday, August 28th, 2024 at 4:04 am and is filed under Brazil, India, North Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE.  You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.  Both comments and pings are currently closed. 

Comments are closed.


ABOUT
WILDCATS AND BLACK SHEEP
Wildcats & Black Sheep is a personal interest blog dedicated to the identification and evaluation of maverick investment opportunities arising in frontier - and, what some may consider to be, “rogue” or “black sheep” - markets around the world.

Focusing primarily on The New Seven Sisters - the largely state owned petroleum companies from the emerging world that have become key players in the oil & gas industry as identified by Carola Hoyos, Chief Energy Correspondent for The Financial Times - but spanning other nascent opportunities around the globe that may hold potential in the years ahead, Wildcats & Black Sheep is a place for the adventurous to contemplate & evaluate the emerging markets of tomorrow.