For an acronym coined by an investment bank in a decades-old report notable mainly for being wrong, “BRICS” has had a good run. It was once an idea, then a summit, and now, for some at least, a global force. The grouping — originally Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2010 — is increasingly described as a counterweight to the existing Western-run multilateral institutions, a sort of G-5 for the Global South.

In fact, it’s nothing of the sort and may never be.

Sure, at times in the past two decades the bloc seemed to have great potential as a source of alternative global norms and institutions, such as its New Development Bank. But — especially since China’s President Xi Jinping consolidated power and instituted a newly aggressive foreign policy — it has become quite difficult to see how it can realize that potential.

Other members of the grouping, particularly India and Brazil, are understandably reluctant to sign up to any redrawing of multilateralism that benefits China more than any other country. They are therefore far less likely to invest time and energy in an institution that threatens to become an instrument of a China-led world order.

For China, at least, one possible solution is clear: Expand the BRICS further, an idea it’s been pushing hard in the runup to the group’s summit in Johannesburg later this month. Adding a few other large developing countries would in theory enhance the BRICS’ legitimacy and increase its capacity.

Yet any expansion of the grouping has become a fraught topic. China would like to admit countries such as Saudi Arabia, which it believes might be tempted away from the US. India and Brazil are visibly unwilling to include any more nations that might simply repeat Chinese talking points. Russia does that already.

Bloomberg News has reported that the first- and fourth-largest democracies have instead proposed Indonesia, insisting that they would be more comfortable with including an established democracy instead of an autocracy such as Saudi Arabia. This is an amusing argument, given that Russia and China are two of the bloc’s other members. More likely, India would prefer Indonesia because it shares a healthy level of concern about Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific.

Regardless, India at least will likely try to stall expansion as long as possible. A BRICS that keeps the West off-balance without actually trying to do anything would be ideal, as far as New Delhi is concerned.

The tussle over expanding the BRICS is a reminder of how hard it will be for any non-Western bloc to cohere if it hopes to include both India and China in positions of leadership. Their decades-old border dispute continues to engender deep suspicion and anger in New Delhi. Indian soldiers’ lives have been lost along the Himalayan frontier in recent years and Indian leaders worry that China will keep on pushing unless forcibly stopped. They are even more upset that their Chinese counterparts refuse to discuss the issue.

Moreover, even if those border issues were magically resolved, the rivalry would persist. Both China and India imagine themselves to be natural leaders of the developing world and neither, for all their talk of multipolarity, has a lot of time for the other’s core interests.

India is perfectly willing to join any club if there’s a chance it can use its membership to stop China from dominating it. Meanwhile, China is equally willing to spend time and capital on new friends that can outvote and outnumber India’s.

Perhaps one day a weak and investment-hungry India will be willing to sign up to Chinese leadership the way that Russia has. Or, perhaps, China will become willing to accommodate India at the top. On that day, we will discover exactly how strong India’s recent tilt towards the liberal West really is.

Until then, however, future BRICS summits — like this year’s — will be a place for India and China to lock horns more than a forum to develop a real challenge to the West.