Sudan’s geopolitical location has encouraged the involvement of countries in the conflict, and a combination of Sahelian and North African countries have come into play.

After Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemeti’ and his (RSF) failed in their coup attempt against Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), they decided to continue their plans to forcefully take over Sudan through capturing several territories in Khartoum – Sudan’s capital and territories in Darfur that they were originally tasked to protect on behalf of the SAF.

Motives of Sudan’s neighbours

At first, Chad sided with the SAF because of established military and security protocols and arrangements that were established through joint military units.  However, with the conflict dragging on it became apparent that Chad supported the RSF.

Chad switched sides as a result of the Hemeti having close ties with Chadian officials such as his cousin General Bichara Issa Djadalla who is the chief of staff of Chad’s president Mahamat Deby. It has been reported that in July 2023, the United Arab Emirates has also offered Deby more than $1bn  to support the RSF through allowing the Chadian city of Amdjarass to be used as a supply line for the RSF from Chad into Darfur, Sudan.

Chad’s support for the RSF would not last long a result of the support base of the Chadian regime hails from the Zaghawa tribe – an African tribe with extensions in both Chad and Sudan – to which the RSF and its allied Arab militia who see the Zaghawa as their enemies in both Chad and Sudan.

At the same time, as a lot of the RSF and their allied Arab militia hail from Chad, an RSF victory in Sudan or RSF forming of government in Darfur will encourage those militiamen to support a co-ethnic rebellion in Chad against the Deby’s regime.

Eritrea evasion

Eritrea has supported Lt. General al-Burhan and his de facto government as a result of the geopolitical consideration of not wanting to be encircled by both the RSF and Ethiopia who both are seen to be close to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Eritrea has been wary of Ethiopia after it signed the Pretoria Peace Agreement with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) instead of eliminating it as Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki intended. Afwerki planned to annihilate the TPLF in an effort to protect his regime from possible TPLF interest in taking over Eritrea.

…these reasons encourage Afwerki to allow armed movements aligned to the de facto government of Burhan to train in Eritrea

Further, Afwerki’s fear has been compounded by Ethiopia’s drive to have access to Eritrea’s sea ports.

In regard to the RSF, Afwerki has intended to keep Eritrea’s borders with eastern Sudan as a buffer zone in order to prevent Eritrean opposition forces from using Sudan’s borders as havens to attack his regime.

The fear of RSF encourages Afwerki to believe Sudan’s eastern border will not be secured, allowing Eritrean opposition to gather in Sudan and to attack his regime from there. Hence, these reasons encourage Afwerki to allow armed movements aligned to the de facto government of Burhan to train in Eritrea.

Egyptian water woes

Egypt also supports Lt. General al-Burhan and his allies against the expansion of the RSF, and inadvertently the UAE. Egypt has been close to Burhan and his allies due to its national security priorities of protecting its borders.

Egypt’s encouragement of securing its borders is a result of it being exposed to its western borders where it had previously supported Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar to stop any possible expansion of Islamists in Libya into Egypt.

At the same time, Egypt has problems protecting its eastern borders because of an armed Islamist insurgency there, coupled with lack of control over tribes in Sinai.  This is compounded by the Israeli policy of pushing Palestinians from Gaza into Sinai, Egypt, in order to end any hopes for Palestinians to have the right to return to their lands.

Further encouraging Egypt to support al-Burhan and his allies is a result of the institutional affinity of both the SAF and the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF). SAF officers were sent to military academies in Egypt for joint military trainings. Egypt also wants Sudan’s support to pressure Ethiopia to sign a legally binding agreement with regards to operating the GERD to secure its water security.

Should the SAF be defeated, Egypt will not be able to guarantee its water security in the face of Ethiopia’s use of GERD to project its power and influence against Egypt.

That is because prior to the conflict in Sudan, Egypt counted on the support of Sudan to renegotiate water quotes agreements with Ethiopia. Therefore, if the de facto government and the SAF are defeated, then Egypt loses its most important ally in the region in the Horn of Africa to ensure the security of 95% of its water supply.

Saudi food security

The conflict also has implications for those not involved in supporting either side of the conflict in Sudan. Saudi Arabia has been focusing on facilitating negotiations to end the conflict. Indeed the Jeddah declaration has allowed it to be a credible facilitator for both the SAF and the RSF and their regional backers and international actors such as the US.

Saudi Arabia’s position as a facilitator allows it to maintain a neutral position to ensure the security of its Saudi Vision 2030, projects such as NEOM and tourist attractions on its Western Coast of the Red Sea.

At the same time before the conflict started in Sudan, Saudi Arabia had RSF forces protecting its southern borders from any attacks from the Houthi movement in Yemen. Moreover, Sudan also provides an opportunity to support Saudi Arabia in its food security.

In 2016, Sudan approved a bill in the legislative council leasing 1 million feddans [units of area used in the region] for a period of 99 years to Saudi Arabia. Hence, the risk of UAE gaining control over Sudan also impacts Saudi Arabia’s food security.

Saudi Arabia’s neutral stance of only wanting to only be a facilitator of negotiations between Burhan’s de facto government and the RSF puts it at risk with the UAE, its frenemy who has an interest in expanding control in the Red Sea.

A RSF victory in Sudan would translate to more influence of the UAE over the Red Sea, where it has been building its influence through controlling ports in Somaliland and Puntland focusing on controlling Sudan’s waterways.

The UAE’s footing of $35bn worth of investments in Egypt’s Ras al-Khaimah project is also an significant indication of the UAE’s growing interest to have exclusive control over the Red Sea waterways into the Mediterranean Sea.

Coup states’ ethnic issues

With countries such as Mali and Niger that are not directly involved in Sudan’s conflict, an RSF victory may encourage co-ethnics of the RSF to also attempt takeovers in their countries through coordinating support from the RSF and the UAE.

Mali will face deeper prospects of division as an RSF victory in Sudan will encourage Mali’s National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) to further renew its drive to establish Azawad as it did in 2012.

Already there are indications that the NMLA are focusing again in re-establishing Azawad.  That translates to further destabilising Mali, west Africa and France’s ally Morocco, which is interested in asserting its authority in Western Sahara.