Senegal’s prime minister, Ousmane Sonko, hopes that a near week-long trip to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will make a difference. On 7 September, he landed at Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport. Armed guards, flags flying – he was welcomed with full honours. With him were Abdourahmane Sarr, his economy minister, and Cheikh Diba, his finance and budget minister. Sonko planned talks with political leaders and with dozens of investors.

Since the exposure of billions of dollars in previously undisclosed public borrowing — Senegal’s so-called ‘hidden debt’ — growth has slowed. Against that backdrop, the two ministers promoted Senegal as a destination for investment, highlighting opportunities in tourism, mining and hydrocarbons.

During the state visit, the Port Autonome de Dakar and Dubai Port World (DP World) signed an addendum to their contract. The Emirati logistics giant has managed Dakar’s port infrastructure since 2007.

In 2022, DP World deepened its foothold and began building the new port of Ndayane for $1.13bn. Designed to handle the world’s largest container ships, the project — the biggest private investment in Senegal to date — aims to multiply the country’s logistics capacity. The privileged partnership shows up in the trade numbers. According to Senegal’s statistics agency, imports from the UAE jumped from $174m in 2019 to $668.5m in 2023, mainly refined fuels, equipment and machinery.

Preparing for a post-oil era

Senegal is not unique. From South Africa to Algeria, via Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo, DP World is often on the front line of the Emirati push, with an eye to making Jebel Ali an essential hub for trade between Africa and Asia. Together, DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports manage a dozen ports on the continent.

“As they diversify beyond oil and gas, the Gulf Cooperation Council states [Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain] have strategically embedded African markets in their economic models,” says an Afreximbank research paper published in December 2024.

The result: bilateral trade above $121bn, with more than $100bn in foreign direct investment (FDI) between 2012 and 2022.

The Emirates are far ahead of other Gulf investors – and the pace is quickening. In February 2024 alone, the UAE announced a $35bn investment in Egypt, roughly a third of all FDI Africa received that year. In return, Abu Dhabi secured development rights for the Ras al-Hikma peninsula on the Mediterranean.

“This isn’t philanthropy. These are prudent, high-potential investments,” says Papa Amadou Sarr, chief executive of the Senegalese investment firm Porteo and formerly an official at France’s development agency, AFD, where he worked on mobilising Gulf funds. “They are preparing for life after oil and investing in Africa as they do elsewhere.”

An African development specialist, who requested anonymity, says: “They offer an advantage in the eyes of many governments – their loans and investments come without conditions tied to environmental protection, labour rights or human rights.”

Building a global minerals hub

With proven oil reserves of around 100 billion barrels – 5.6% of the world total – the UAE is awash with crude. Prices have risen since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic – from about $22 a barrel in April 2020 to an average near $70 in 2025, with a $120 spike in 2022 – giving Abu Dhabi ample revenue to fund its ambitions.

In June 2025, International Resources Holding (IRH), controlled by a brother of UAE president Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), said it would buy a majority stake in Alphamin Resources for $366m. The deal gives IRH access to the Bisie mining complex in DRC – among the world’s biggest and richest tin deposits, accounting for 6% of global supply. IRH also bought 51% of Zambia’s Mopani mine in 2024 for $1.1bn.

They have a military presence and sometimes go so far as to exacerbate local tensions

In 2023, DRC’s state-backed miner Sakima and Emirati firm Primera Mining signed what was branded the ‘contract of the century’. Worth more than $1.9bn, it aims to develop ‘more than four industrial mines’ to connect South Kivu and Maniema provinces. Target metals: gold and the ‘3Ts’ – tin, tantalum and tungsten.

“The goal is to become a global hub for mineral processing, so they are investing across the value chain,” says Torbjorn Soltvedt, an associate director at risk consultancy Maplecroft. In Morocco, the UAE also topped the FDI league in 2024 with an 18.9% share of net inflows, according to the Office des Changes, the country’s foreign exchange authority.

The debt risk

From north to south, west to east, Emirati petrodollars are flowing. Do these investments truly benefit Africa? “Yes,” says Afreximbank in its December 2024 report. The partnerships offer “significant opportunities, including increased investment, improved agriculture, job creation and infrastructure development, thereby strengthening Africa’s economic resilience”. The bank adds a warning, however – “fiscal risks could arise if returns on concessional loans fail to materialise”.

China led the continent’s infrastructure boom for more than a decade. It also left several countries mired in debt, notably Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana. “Unlike China at times, the Emiratis don’t lend into obvious distress – they are more cautious,” says the same expert.

‘Exacerbating local tensions’

“African countries need to be well equipped to negotiate win-win deals,” says Papa Amadou Sarr. “When investment is mainly in resource extraction or exports, with no local processing, countries remain stuck as raw-material suppliers.”

A darker side of the UAE’s role has been highlighted by Swissaid, a Swiss development NGO known for investigating Africa’s gold trade. A 2024 report by the organisation found that between 2012 and 2022, the Emirates imported 2,569 tonnes of African gold that had not been declared for export. That amounts to more than $115.3bn spirited off the continent illegally.

Nor are the Emiratis confined to business. “They have a military presence and sometimes go so far as to exacerbate local tensions,” says Jean-Loup Samaan, a researcher at the National University of Singapore.

The Emirates played a decisive role during the Arab uprisings, particularly in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. In the Horn of Africa, their support for Ethiopia’s government helped shape the outcome of the Tigray war, and their influence in the region is well documented.

Abu Dhabi is also deeply involved in Sudan’s ongoing conflict, backing the Rapid Support Forces militia. “This militia is accused of war crimes that could amount to genocide. By providing arms and support, the UAE bears part of the responsibility,” says Samaan.

Yet the small Gulf state keeps gaining influence. Chad will present its National Development Plan in Abu Dhabi on 7–8 November, seeking Gulf support for part of the $30bn ‘Chad Connection 2030’ initiative.

“A few years ago, the government would have held this event in Paris. It shows the continent’s centre of gravity is shifting east,” our expert says. Is it at the risk of swapping one form of neo-colonialism for another?